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Chapter 1
Introduction
In everyday life we usually act to achieve a desired goal. For instance, we switch on the
light to illuminate a room. In order to act goal-oriented one has to know in advance
which actions are necessary to achieve the desired goal. In other words, the actor has
to have a mental representation of the intended effects or goals before moving. If we as-
sume that a mental representation precedes goal-directed, or voluntary, actions interesting
questions arise. How are these effect representations acquired? How does our cognitive
system know which action causes which effect? How can mental representations of the
action-effects be used to control or guide our movements? The aim of this thesis is to pro-
vide empirical evidence and theoretical insides concerning the question of how actions are
controlled specifically focussing on the role of unconscious action-effects in action plan-
ning and control. Behavioral as well as electrophysiological measures are used mostly
in combination with subliminal priming paradigms to investigate this issue. Chapter 2
provides an overview over theoretical approaches and important empirical findings con-
cerning action control mechanisms. It also provides theoretical information about the
experimental paradigm (visual masking) and electrophysiological measures (in particular,
the lateralized readiness potential derived from the electroencephalogram) used in this
dissertation. Thereafter, in chapter 3, own studies using behavioral and electrophysiolog-
ical measures are described. The experiments aim to clarify and complement established
knowledge about the role of action-effects in action control. Specifically, the influence
of unconsciously presented action-effect features on response activation and selection pro-
cesses was investigated. Furthermore, action-effects with different emotional valences were
1
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used to study whether emotional features of action-effects become integrated into action
representations and whether they influence response selection differently. In chapter 4 the
obtained results are discussed and integrated into a more general theoretical view of action
control mechanisms and the free will debate.
The fact that in all my experiments participants performed simple key-pressing
actions makes it necessary to briefly justify why I consider these actions to be suited to
investigate general action control or planning processes. Any voluntary action can be
defined as goal-directed behavior (e.g., Hommel, 2003; Prinz, 2000). They are directed
towards a particular anticipated goal and play a causal role in fulfilling that goal (i.e.,
attaining intended effects). As noted above, to perform a goal-directed (voluntary) action
one has to have a mental representation of the desired goal or intended effect. Anticipated
sensory consequences of actions (i.e., action-effects) can be twofold: First, they can refer
to movements of one’s own effectors (e.g., the perceived feedback of muscles joints etc.),
or, second, they can refer to remote (visual or auditory) changes in the outside world.
According to James (1890) the anticipation of both types of action-effects can be equally
used to initiate actions. Thus, according to the above definition of voluntary action, even
key-presses - despite their simplicity - are voluntary actions which are performed to produce
an intended effect. The proximate action-effect, in this case, is the perception of the feeling
of the finger pressing down the key, whereas, more remote effects may concern changes in
the surrounding of the observer (e.g., that a light turns on or the participant communicates
a specific judgement in accordance with the prior experimental instructions). But are these
simple key-press actions really comparable to the much more complex actions we usually
produce in everyday life? Everyday goals often refer to the distant future and are usually
not achieved by performing only one simple action. To achieve long-term goals, sequences
of actions have to be performed and hierarchically organized sub-goal structures must
be processed. One example is driving to work by car. The final goal might be getting
to work but to achieve this one has to realize several sub-goals like turning right at the
appropriate corner or shifting gears. Complex action planning thus can be decomposed
into the planning of simpler sub-actions, each of which is structurally equal in that it is
directed at achieving a particular sub-goal. Therefore, it seems justified to study simple
key-press actions in the laboratory to acquire knowledge about action control processes as
it is the case in the experiments conducted in this dissertation.
Chapter 2
Theoretical background
2.1 Theories of action control
Two major theoretical approaches about what actions are and how they are controlled can
be distinguished: Sensorimotor and ideomotor theories. The sensorimotor view assumes
that actions are triggered by external causes or stimuli, whereas the ideomotor principle
(IMP) views actions as results of internal causes like goals or intentions. The following
sections describe these two theoretical lines in more detail.
2.1.1 Sensorimotor mapping
The sensorimotor view states that actions are ”re-actions”, meaning that they are triggered
by external cues (’stimulus trigger hypothesis’). The idea is, that actions are initiated once
appropriate triggering conditions have been perceived, as, for instance, when one stops the
car when seeing a red traffic light. Historically, this view dates back to one of Descartes’
(1664) assumptions that actions are the result of the perceived events (e.g., his notion of
an reflexive arc). More recently, behavioristic as well as more cognitive oriented research
like serial information processing theories (Neisser, 1967; Donders, 1862) were influenced
by this view. By sensorimotor mapping, people acquire associations between cueing stim-
uli (S) and subsequent actions or responses (R) (e.g., they learn under which external
circumstances it is appropriate to carry out an action). It is likely that this acquisition
process relies on associative learning mechanisms integrating events that frequently occur
3
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in close temporal succession. One function of sensorimotor mapping in everyday life is
the adaptation of behavior to the environment by allowing quick changes in behavior in
reaction to environmental changes. For instance, when driving a car, perceiving the red
traffic light allows one to appropriately adjust behavior by stepping on the brake. In the
laboratory, questions concerning sensorimotor theories are investigated with tasks which
include well-defined sets of stimuli and responses (as for instance in instrumental condi-
tioning, paired-associate learning, or forced-choice reaction tasks). In these paradigms
the task instructions specify which stimuli can occur, which responses can be selected,
and which rules govern the mapping of responses to stimuli (Sanders, 1980, 1998; Toni &
Passingham, 1999; Wise & Murray, 2000). For instance, a typical instruction could be to
press the left key whenever a red square appears and a right key whenever a green square
appears. In such a case the stimulus (e.g., red square) is associated with the response (e.g.,
left) and the subsequent perception of the stimulus is thought to trigger the corresponding
response. Questions investigated in the context of sensorimotor theories are how associ-
ations between sensory cues and subsequent actions are acquired and how S-R relations
are represented internally. Of further interest is the question of which factors determine
the strength of these S-R associations and how one can separate processing stages and
operations by which stimulus information is translated into motor commands.
Although sensorimotor theories of action have been very successful they clearly do
not capture all processes involved in action control. Specifically, they disregard one of
the most important feature of voluntary actions: Their guidance by intentions or goals
(Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). This additional feature is accounted
for in ideomotor views of action control.
2.1.2 The ideomotor principle (IMP)
To perform an intentional, goal-directed action, the agent needs to know what conse-
quences a particular movement will have. Therefore, voluntary actions not only depend
on the ability to extract appropriate action ”triggering” stimuli but also on the ability to
learn associations between movements and their perceivable consequences. The ideomotor
principle (IMP) relates actions to their contingent sensory effects. It describes how action
is guided by perception and imagery. Unlike in the sensorimotor view where external
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Action Effect
ActionEffect
bidirectional Association
(1) 
(2) 
automatic Activation
Figure 2.1: Two processes involved in action control according to the ideomotor view. (1)
First, randomly generated movements lead to specific changes in the environment (effects). The motor
pattern of the action is then associated with its effect in a bidirectional fashion. (2) Once action-effect
associations have been acquired, action control is based on the fact that actions are automatically activated
by anticipating their consequences (effects).
cues are associated with responses, by ideomotor learning, associations between actions
(responses; R) and subsequent sensory events (i.e., action-effects; E) are acquired (R-E
relations). The importance of ideomotor learning is obvious: Without learning associa-
tions between actions and their consequences, we would be unable to plan a movement
that is appropriate to achieve a desired action-effect (i.e., a goal). As mentioned above,
action-effects can be any internal or external changes following a movement. The idea is
that whenever an action is carried out and an effect (change) is registered the action and
the effect are linked together (i.e., associated). This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Associations between actions and their subsequent effects are assumed to be bidirec-
tional. Therefore, not only does performing an action lead to the anticipation of its sensory
effect, but the converse is also true: anticipating an action-effect triggers the action that
usually brings about this effect. Thus, the IMP states that whenever a person performs a
voluntary action, this action has been triggered by the anticipation of the intended effects.
One example, which illustrates how the IMP and sensorimotor mapping differ is stopping
a car at a red traffic light. According to the sensorimotor view the driver stops the car
because the ”red” is signaling him to ”stop” and the perception of this signal leads to
the selection of the braking action. In contrast, according to the ideomotor view he stops
the car because he wants to avoid an accident. He therefore desires to stop the car and
anticipating that goal leads to the recruitment of the appropriate action.
Although the term ”ideomotor” was introduced by Carpenter (1852 ) and the ideo-
motor principle mostly popularized by William James (1890) in his famous book ”Princi-
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ples of psychology”, one of the earliest theoretical assumptions of how voluntary actions
may be controlled from the perspective of an ideomotor view stems from the philosopher
Lotze. Lotze (1852) observed that when a motion is perceived (e.g., throwing of a ball),
the perception is often accompanied by small body movements (e.g., of an arm) suggest-
ing that humans tend to imitate or copy perceived actions (”Nachahmungsbewegungen”;
Prinz, 1987; Hoffmann, 1993). This observation led Lotze to assume that mental repre-
sentations of movements are powerful enough to induce corresponding motor patterns in
the perceiver. Lotze (1852) was also one of the first to propose that voluntary actions
are based on an associative learning process starting shortly after birth. He assumed that
the ”soul” registers sensory changes following movements, and that connections between
these changes and the movements which caused them are established. After relationships
between actions and effects have been learned, merely thinking of a desired effect will
automatically lead to the execution of the appropriate body movements. Harless (1861)
specified in more details how movement-related knowledge is acquired and used later on.
Like Lotze, he assumed that the associations between a motor code (m) and a sensory
code (s) are essential for voluntary actions. If one wants to perform an action to at-
tain a desired effect one makes intentional, goal-directed use of learned knowledge about
m-s associations to recruit appropriate movements. Since the associations are assumed
to be bidirectional, re-activating (i.e., anticipating by perceiving, imagining, or thinking
of) the representation of a particular action-effect (s) results in the automatic activation
of the associated movement pattern (m). The ideas by Lotze (1852) and Harless (1861)
were adopted by William James (1890). Including their contributions along with concepts
brought forward by others (e.g., Carpenter, 1852) in his classic textbook ”Principles of
psychology” ensured the spreading of the ideomotor idea (Stock & Stock, 2004). Of course,
the ideas by Lotze, Harless and others were very general and not tested experimentally.
More recently, however, the theoretical framework underlying the IMP has been devel-
oped further, leading to specific and testable assumptions of how action-effects control our
actions, both simple and more complex ones (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hoffmann, 1993;
Hommel, 2003; Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997).
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2.1.3 The acquisition and control of actions: A two-stage model
Recently, a more specific theoretical and experimental approach was taken by Elsner and
Hommel (2001) to solve the question of how action-effect representations are acquired and
how they are used to control our actions. Following ideas by Lotze and Harless, these
authors propose that voluntary actions are acquired via a two-stage associative learning
process. In a first stage relationships between movements and their consequences (effects)
are perceived/encoded. This experience leads to an automatic integration of the cognitive
codes of the movement (motor codes, response codes) and the codes of the effect (sensory
feature codes). In a second stage these learned movement-effect associations are now used
to guide or control actions. If one wants to attain a desired effect a mental representation
of this effect is produced by the cognitive system via effect anticipation (by perceiving,
imagining or thinking of the effect). The effect-anticipation leads to the activation of
the movement pattern associated with this effect. The following section describes this
two-stage model of action control in more detail.
The acquisition of movement-effect relations
The first stage of the model proposed by Elsner and Hommel (2001) is the automatic ac-
quisition of response-effect (R-E) associations or, in other words, of contingencies between
movements and effects. In this stage codes of movements and their perceived consequences
(action-effects) are linked in a bidirectional fashion. Knowledge about action-effect rela-
tions is essential for performing goal-oriented actions. Figure 2.2 presents a gross model
of how the acquisition of R-E associations is thought to operate. First, a randomly gen-
erated motor pattern is set up and a movement is carried out. The movement results in
a particular effect (that is, a perceivable internal or external change). The registration of
these changes leads to a certain pattern of activation in the cognitive system. If a motor
and sensory pattern are experienced together several times, an association between the
action and its effects is formed via simple learning mechanisms. As a consequence, the
feature codes of the movement and its sensory effect are automatically integrated into a
representation of this action.
As an example consider a baby moving its arms in a random fashion. On some
occasions the baby might hit a bell hanging above his head. The bell produces a sound and
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Figure 2.2: Stage 1 of the two-stage model of the emergence of action control. A motor pattern
produces a certain effect and is automatically integrated with the cognitive (sensory) codes representing
this effect (adapted from Elsner & Hommel, 2001).
swings (the effects) and this is registered by the baby’s cognitive system. If this accidental
hitting of the bell occurs several times, the specific motor pattern of the arm movement
(the action code) is associated with the sensory codes of the effects, that is, the sound of
the bell (auditory effect) and its swinging (visual effect). Besides motor and effect feature
codes (visual, tactile, auditory) 1, action representations must also contain information
about the context in which the action is carried out (Hoffmann, 1993). In summary, the
first stage of the two-stage model is an associative learning process which links movements
to their perceivable consequences. As will be shown in the next section, these bidirectional
R-E associations are a necessary requirement for action planning processes.
The planning and selection of actions
The second stage of the model represents the actual action control process. It explains
how movements are selected by activating perceptual codes that represent a desired goal
or action-effect. Action planning or control can thus also be seen as a binding process
that integrates codes of the features that the intended action should have. As described
1It is likely that not only directly perceivable but also subjective effect feature codes can become part
of the cognitive representation of an action (e.g., Beckers, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002; see 2.2, page 12 for
details).
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Figure 2.3: Stage 2 of the two-stage model of action control. Movements are recruited by acti-
vating the cognitive codes representing desired outcomes (action-effects)(adapted from Elsner & Hommel,
2001).
above, experiencing contingencies between actions and sensory events leads to the forma-
tion of bidirectional links between the motor codes of that action and the codes of the
accompanying effects. This bidirectional linkage is essential for action planning because it
makes it possible that actions can be primed, retrieved, and launched by activating (men-
tally represented) features of their effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; see Figure 2.3). This
activation can happen intentionally or incidentally by stimuli that share features with the
action-effects. Activating an effect code will tend to activate its associated motor pattern
(i.e., motor code) to a certain degree. It is this activation, which allows the effect-oriented
selection of actions. The spreading of activation from the effect feature codes to the mo-
tor codes is thought to happen automatically (independently of the actor’s intentions).
Nevertheless, additional intentional processes play an important role in action control by
endogenously activating effect representations, which then automatically trigger associ-
ated motor codes. If the baby from the example given above wants to hear the sound of
the bell again, it may ”think of” or imagine the sound. This thought or image will activate
the auditory effect code, which will - if sufficiently strong - lead to an automatic spreading
of activation to the associated motor codes.
More specifically, Elsner and Hommel (in press) assume three phases involved in
action planning: an activation-phase, an integration-phase, and an implementation-phase.
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During the activation-phase the features of the to-be executed action are specified. This
is achieved by activating feature codes representing the sensory effects of the intended
action. Importantly, not all feature codes of the effect have to be activated. The idea
is that activating only one feature is often sufficient to elicit a spreading of activation
to the other elements of the action representation. The activation of feature codes can
be triggered by internal sources (imagining) or by external sources in the environment
(contextual information). Importantly, the activation of the feature codes leads to an
automatic activation of the motor codes associated with these features which can influence
response selection, response initiation and response execution (Hommel, in press; Kunde,
Koch, & Hoffmann, 2004). Of course, this response priming does not automatically lead
to the execution of the action represented by the motor codes. If this would be the case,
we would carry out inappropriate actions all the time which are unwillingly triggered by
external stimuli 2. During the second phase, the integration-phase, all activated feature
codes belonging to the intended action are integrated and temporarily bound into an
action plan. One problem, that is associated with the integration of feature codes is how
our cognitive system ”knows” which motor codes and which effect codes belong to which
action plan? This problem arise when we pursue not only one, but several action plans
at the same time (Hommel, in press). Often, prepared action plans overlap temporarily,
as when we do different things simultaneously like talking while riding a bike. How does
the activation of an effect code lead to the automatic activation of the correct motor
code? How are the elements belonging to an action plan bound together in the brain
3? These questions refer to the so-called ”binding problem”. The most likely solution is
that cortically distributed elements of an action plan are integrated by coordinating their
temporal properties (Hommel, in press). All elements belonging to one action plan receive
2An unavoidable immediate execution of the primed action can be seen in patients with bilateral frontal
lobe lesions who show so-called ’utilization behavior’. They for instance grasp objects, like a tooth-brush,
and use it although doing so is inappropriate (Lhermitte, 1983).)
3Recent findings based on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography
(PET), and single cell recordings in monkeys provided evidence that a network of neurons, distributed over
distant brain areas is involved in action planning and that information processing is realized in a parallel
fashion. These brain areas include primary motor cortex (M1; area 4), the pre-motor cortex (PMC), the
supplementary motor area (SMA), the frontal-eye-fields (FEF), and the posterior parietal cortex (area 5,
area 7) as well as parts of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and parts of the posterior cingulate (area 24).
The sub-cortical areas include the cerebellum and the basal ganglia (Dettmars, Fink, Lemon, Stephan,
Passingham, Sibersweig, Holmes, Ridding, Brooks, & Frackowiak, 1995; Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002;
Requin, Lecas, & Vitton, 1990; Requin, 1992; Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998).
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a ”tag”, by which they can identify each other and thus be bound together. Such a tag
could consist in the temporal pattern of neural activity, in particular the firing of neurons or
assemblies of neurons belonging to the same action plan (Hommel, in press; Singer, 1994;
von der Malsburg, 1995). Many studies within the field of visual feature binding have
suggested that temporal synchronization is a plausible candidate for functionally linking
neurons within and between cortical areas and subcortical structures (Singer, 1994; Basar-
Eroglu, Strüber, Schürmann, Stadler, & Basar, 1996 for review). Recent studies have
provided evidence for the role of synchronization in action control as well (Pfurtscheller,
Flotzinger, & Neuper, 1994; Salenius, Salmelin, Neuper, Pfurtscheller, & Hari, 1996). For
the time during which an action plan is activated, the feature codes belonging to it are
less available for planning other actions involving the same features (Stoet & Hommel,
1999). However, after the action has been executed this feature binding decays and the
feature codes are again available for other planning activities.
The automatic activation of motor codes by the activation of feature codes and their
integration into a coherent action plan takes place during the activation- and integration-
phase. As noted above, in these stages, only partial response activation is achieved which
does not necessarily (or usually) lead to the execution of the action. The actual imple-
mentation of the action plan takes place in the third step - the implementation-phase.
If an action plan is sufficiently prepared (i.e., an action plan is set up and the action is
ready to be carried out) information between planning structures and the motor system is
released, and the action can be executed (Elsner & Hommel, in press). The planning of an
action (i.e., the activation and integration of feature codes) and its implementation seem
to be functionally and temporally independent from each other (De Jong, 1993; Elsner &
Hommel, in press; Sommer, Leuthold, Abdel-Rahman & Pfütze, 1997).
In summary, the elaborated two-stage model explains how, in accordance with the
ideomotor principle, actions are selected by anticipating (i.e., by activating the codes of)
their consequences. A novel feature of this account is that actions are cognitively repre-
sented in a distributed fashion (in terms of their features). Action plans are interconnected
bundles of action feature representations (e.g., effect codes, motor codes, context codes).
Activation of only a few feature codes belonging to an integrated action representation will
tend to activate the whole action representation, including its motor part. This means,
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that not all possible effects or all features of a given effect have to be anticipated or per-
ceived to activate the action representation. However, the more features are activated, the
greater is the activation of the motor pattern. This increases the likelihood of actually
selecting and executing the associated action (Hommel, 2003).
2.2 Empirical findings on the role of effect anticipation in
action control
Over the past decades numerous empirical studies have been conducted concerning the
role of action-effects in action control. The next section will review empirical findings con-
cerning action control processes, in particular the ideomotor principle, which are relevant
for the experiments conducted in this thesis. Because of the huge amount of research con-
ducted in the field of action control this review is restricted to experiments investigating
the control of very simple actions. Research on more complex actions or general theories
of motivation and volition will not be discussed (e.g., Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Goll-
witzer, 1990, 1993; Lewin, 1926; Mischel, 1996). Although the latter theories may appear
more transferable to everyday actions, it should be noted that more complex everyday
actions are composed out of simpler elements, which are organized in a hierarchical and
sequential manner (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Hacker, 1998; Miller, Galanter & Pribram,
1960). For instance, the complex action of writing a Phd thesis can be decomposed into
simpler actions like reading articles, analyzing data, writing chapters, which in turn are
composed out of even simpler actions (e.g., writing a sentence), which ultimately consist of
simple responses (e.g., typing a particular letter). Thus studying action control processes
in seemingly artificial experiments using simple actions in the laboratory does not mean
that the processes under investigation are not also operative in the execution of more
complex actions.
One early experimental approach to the ideomotor principle was taken by Greenwald
(1970a,b). Greenwald (1970a,b) was one of the first who proposed to associate actions with
additional sensory effects via a learning process within an experimental setting to test
whether these novel effects can activate their associated actions if presented later on. A
more recent approach to empirically test the ideomotor principle and the role of intended
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action-effects in action control was taken by Hommel (1996). His experiments consisted of
two phases - an acquisition-phase and a test-phase. During the acquisition-phase the task
was to press a particular key as fast as possible in reaction to a particular visual stimulus
(e.g., O > left key-press; X > right key-press). Contingent on the key-press a tone was
presented as the action-effect (e.g., left key-press > high tone; right key-press > low tone).
During the test-phase the visual stimuli (O or X) were presented again as targets and a
key-press reaction was asked for. Shortly before or accompanying the imperative stimuli,
the action-effect tones from the acquisition-phase were presented as primes. Depending
on the combination of the prime - target pairs congruent (high tone - O, low tone - X) or
incongruent (high tone - X, low tone - O) trials were realized. The results showed that
response times (RTs) were shorter in the congruent than in the incongruent condition.
This finding indicates that the repeated experience of a tone following a motor response
(key-press) led to an automatic formation of a bilateral action-effect association in the
acquisition-phase, which is in accordance with the two-stage model of action control. In
the test-phase the presentation of the former effect-tone prior to the key-press led to
some activation of the associated motor code, which speeded up response selection in the
congruent condition, but slowed down performance in the incongruent condition.
Another series of experiments conducted by Elsner and Hommel (2001) is consistent
with these conclusions. These authors showed that action-effect associations do not only
affect the speed of response selection, but may also influence which action is selected.
Again, there was an acquisition- and a test-phase. During the acquisition-phase free-
choice key-presses had to be executed in response to a Go-signal (tone). The key-presses
were followed by effect-tones which were contingent on the key-presses (e.g., left key-
press > high tone; right key-press > low tone). During the test-phase the effect-tones
were presented randomly and participants were asked to freely choose to press one of the
keys known from the acquisition-phase. The results showed that the choices were not
random, but rather depended systematically on the type of tone. If the tone previously
delivered after a left key-press (the high tone) was presented it was more likely that the
participants pressed the left key in reaction (acquisition-consistent choice) and vice versa.
One possibility, which cannot be entirely ruled out, is that participants used a deliberate
response strategy in the test-phase (e.g., ”Whenever a high tone appears I will press the
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right key”). If this would be the case, the influence of response priming by the action-effect
stimuli would not become evident in the response choices because the intended, conscious
strategy is much more stronger than the unconscious, automatic priming effect (at least
in the majority of trials). One way to avoid conscious response strategies would be to use
subliminal primes (e.g., stimuli which participants do not become aware of) as action-effect
primes during the test-phase. Despite the possibility of conscious response strategies, the
findings by Elsner and Hommel (2001) again indicate that bilateral associations between
movements codes and their perceivable effects are formed automatically and - importantly
- that action-effect representations play a crucial role in action planning. A study using
positron emission tomography (PET) with a similar experimental design showed that
the caudal supplementary motor area (SMA) and the right hippocampus were activated
when participants merely perceived former action-effect tones (Elsner, Hommel, Mentschel,
Drzezga, Prinz, Conrad, & Siebner, 2002). The increased activation in the SMA suggests
that representations of motor actions are indeed automatically activated if features of their
former effects are perceived. The activation of the hippocampus may relate to the retrieval
of action-effects rules from episodic-memory. Furthermore, it has been shown that the pre-
motor cortex is activated while watching a familiar, purposeful action but not when new,
meaningless actions are observed (Decety, Grezes, Costes, Perani, Jeannerod, Procyk,
Grassi, & Fazio, 1997), which is in accordance with the ideomotor view of action control.
There is also neurophysiological evidence for the integration of observed (perceived) action
codes. It has been shown that the same cells were active when a macaque monkey either
performed a goal-directed action himself and when he watched an experimenter performing
the action (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1992). Analogous results were
obtained in humans with imaging techniques (Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996;
see Hommel, in press).
The finding that action-effects may prime actions with which they have been asso-
ciated is not a modality specific phenomenon. It appears that many kinds of action-effect
stimuli can become effective action-primes. The establishment of action-effect learning
in the auditory domain using tones has been shown in numerous experiments across dif-
ferent laboratories (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Elsner et al., 2002; Hoffmann, Sebald, &
Stöcker, 2001; Hommel, 1996; Hommel & Elsner, 2001; Kunde, Hoffmann, & Zellman,
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2002; Stöcker & Hoffmann, 2004). There is also evidence for the integration of actions
and their consequences in the visual domain (Ansorge, 2002; Hommel, 1993; Ziessler,
1998; Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2001, 2002; Hommel, Alonsa, & Fuentes, 2003). It has
been shown that action representations include information about very different kinds
of action-effects (proximal and remote, immediate and delayed) (Hommel, 1997, 1998).
Furthermore, the automatic acquisition of action-effects does not seem to be restricted to
simple forced-choice tasks. With serial learning tasks (e.g., learning of complex sequences
of key-presses) it has for instance been shown that sequence learning was much better
and faster if the key-presses produced certain tones so that the subjects could integrate
their responses with the tones and thus learned the ’melody’ they produced (e.g., Sebald,
Hoffmann, & Stöcker, 1999; see also Hoffmann et al., 2001; Stöcker & Hoffmann, 2004;
Ziessler, 1998). The concept of ideomotor action can also be found in acquiring knowledge
of how to act successfully in different situations (i.e., action competence; Hoffmann &
Sebald, 2000; Stock & Hoffmann, 2002). In most situations it is not enough to know the
consequences an action might have for the action to be useful. An action representation
must contain some specification of the context conditions under which it should be carried
out (Hoffmann, 1993). These context conditions are most likely acquired intentionally. For
instance, if playing the piano sight-read (by notes), one has to learn at some point which
note belongs to which key. The player sees a note (context), presses the corresponding key
(action) and produces a particular tone (effect). After this intentional, conscious learning
process, the playing action (pressing a key in response to a certain note to produce a
certain tone) can be performed automatically (Neumann & Prinz, 1987; for similar ideas
see Allport, 1980; Anderson, 1982).
The experiments reviewed so far suggest that the perception of previously expe-
rienced action-effects activate representations of the actions with which they had been
associated. However, to obtain convincing support for the ideomotor principle, it is not
sufficient to show that former action-effects influence response selection when perceived
before response execution. What needs to be shown is that action-effects become antici-
pated and influence performance when the effect-stimulus is not presented and thus not
perceived before response execution (Hommel, 1998; Kunde, 2001). Evidence for this as-
sumption was for instance presented by Kunde (2001), who showed that forthcoming (i.e.,
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anticipated) action-effects influence action selection in the same way as if these effects
were already perceived prior to the action. A four-alternative choice response time task
was applied. Each of two effect tones was mapped onto two responses (e.g., response1
(R1) - effect-tone1 (T1), R2 - T2, R3 - T1, R4 - T2). At the beginning of each trial a cue
indicated which of the four responses was most likely to be carried out in that trial and
could therefore be prepared. The results showed that RTs were shortest on trials where
the cued response was indeed asked for, i.e., on trials which were correctly prepared. More
importantly, in the other unprepared trials the performance depended on the action-effect
tones. Although RTs were generally longer on unprepared trials as compared to correctly
prepared trials, the slowing was reduced when the required response shared its effect-tone
with the prepared response (e.g., when R1 was prepared and R3 had to be executed; both
responses share the same effect-tone (T1)). Thereby it was demonstrated that preparing a
response is accompanied by an activation of the associated action-effect code (e.g., prepar-
ing R1 activates T1). This activated effect code (T1) then also primes other responses
linked to it (R3 in the example).
Recently, it has been shown that not only directly perceivable but also more subjec-
tive features of an action-effect become integrated into action representations. By using
electrocutaneous action-effects, Beckers et al. (2002) showed that the emotional valence of
action consequences has an influence on subsequent action selection. In the acquisition-
phase of these experiments participants had to move a key up or down to characterize
neutral words as nouns or verbs. One of the two responses was always followed by a mild
electric shock (negative action-effect) whereas the other response did not have any effect
(positive action-effect). In the test-phase the task was to rate the valence of words (neg-
ative or positive) by moving the same key up or down. They found that the response to
negative words was faster with the response directions associated with the shock and posi-
tive words were responded to more quickly with the response not followed by a shock. This
indicates that actions acquire the emotional valences of their consequences. Another in-
teresting area of research is the ontogenetic development of the acquisition of action-effect
associations and their use in action control. There is converging evidence that bilateral
association between responses and their sensory effects can be acquired from birth on
(Watson & Ramey, 1972; Rovee & Rovee, 1969). The development of action-planning
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abilities (and the intentional use of knowledge about action-effect relations) on the other
hand is slower and extends over a longer time period (e.g., Diamond, 1990; Diamond &
Gilbert, 1989; Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Mischel & Mischel, 1983). Eenshuistra, Weidema,
and Hommel (2004) showed that 4-5 and 7 year old children acquire response-effect asso-
ciations automatically to an equal degree but that the younger children tend to forget the
current action goal more frequently. As a consequence, their behavior is more strongly
influenced by automatic, stimulus-triggered response tendencies.
A question, which has only recently been addressed, but which is of central interest in
this dissertation, is whether effect-feature codes have to be consciously perceived in order to
induce motor activation. Research from the field of motivational psychology suggests that
goals can become activated without conscious awareness and then operate nonconsciously
to guide behavior (Bargh, 1990; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel,
2001). In one of their experiments, Bargh et al. (2001) showed that unconscious priming
of the goal to perform well caused participants to perform comparatively better on an
intellectual task. Nonconsciously activated goals apparently caused the same attention to
and processing of goal-relevant information like consciously activated ones which led the
authors to the conclusion that it does not matter how a goal is activated - consciously or
unconsciously. The same could be true for effect representations and their influence on
response activation. First evidence that subliminally presented action-effects can activate
associated response codes comes from Kunde (2004). During the acquisition-phase of these
experiments, participants performed free-choice key-presses in reaction to a Go-signal.
Contingent on the key-presses a visual action-effect appeared (e.g., left key-press > arrow
down; right key-press > arrow up). The test-phase was a speeded forced-choice reaction
task, were participants had to respond to newly defined targets (e.g., red square > left
key-press; blue square > right key-press). Before each target one of the two action-effect
arrows from the acquisition-phase was presented below the threshold of awareness as a
prime. Two possible prime-target pairs result from this design: response-compatible trials
(e.g., arrow down - red square; arrow up - blue square) or response-incompatible trials
(e.g., arrow down - blue square; arrow up - red square). The results revealed that RTs were
shorter on compatible trials than on incompatible trials indicating that the unconscious
effect-primes activated their corresponding response codes, which facilitated the reaction
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to the targets on compatible trials.
That unconsciously presented stimuli can in principle influence behavior has been
shown in numerous forced-choice reaction tasks (e.g., Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Eimer &
Schlaghecken, 1998; Dehaene, Naccache, Le Clec, Koechlin, Mueller, Dehaene-Lambertz,
et al., 1998; Cheesman & Merikle, 1986). So-called subliminal priming effects are usually
obtained with paradigms using visual masks to reduce the visibility of the stimulus such
that is remains below the threshold of awareness. As this thesis focuses on unconsciously
presented action-effects an overview over types of visual masking as well as results obtained
with different subliminal priming paradigms is necessary. The next section aims to provide
this overview.
2.3 Visual masking and subliminal priming
2.3.1 Types of masking
Visual masking is a process where the response to one stimulus (prime or target) is affected
by the presentation of another stimulus (mask). Masking occurs when the visual system
is given insufficient time to identify individual stimuli. This happens if two stimuli are
delivered to observers in rapid succession. The assumption is that the percept of the two
stimuli is temporally summed which makes it difficult to identify the individual structure
of either stimulus. Behavioral as well as electrophysiological studies have shown that stim-
uli presented near or below the threshold of conscious awareness can nevertheless influence
human behavior (for an overview see Enns & DiLollo, 2004). Three general types of mask-
ing can be separated based on the spatial relationship between the edges of the target and
the mask: Pattern-masking, metacontrast-masking, and object-substitution-masking. If
the contours of target and mask are spatially superimposed the masking is referred to
as pattern-masking. Pattern-masking can affect different stages of processing depending
on the physical appearance of the masks used and the stimulus-onset-asynchrony (SOA;
interval between the onset of the target and the onset of the mask). It can either produce
integration- or interruption-masking. Integration-masking occurs when the representa-
tions of the target and mask are integrated. This happens under conditions where the
target and the mask are perceived as belonging to one and the same pattern due to in-
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sufficient temporal resolution of the visual system. Thereby, the target becomes difficult
to identify, contrast is reduced, and masking is produced (i.e., Kinsbourne & Warrington,
1962; Erikson, 1966). Integration-masking is believed to disrupt early, pre-representational
stages of the target encoding process. It is strongest at an inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) of
0 (i.e., if the two stimuli are presented simultaneously) and under forward masking con-
ditions (i.e., if the mask precedes the target). The second process, inducible by pattern
masking, is interruption-masking. Interruption-masking means that the mask interrupts
the processing of the target before it is completed (i.e., Sperling, 1960). It is obtained
under backward-masking conditions (i.e., when the target precedes the mask), occurs at
longer ISIs (with maximal masking at an interval of about 30-60 ms) and increases with
increasing ISIs (see Bachman & Allik, 1976; Turvey, 1973). The masking function is re-
ferred to as U- or J-shaped. Interruption-masking is considered to originate in the primary
visual cortex or later (Bachman & Allik, 1976) and to affect later (more central) stages
of processing, perhaps including the stage at which the binding of separated features into
coherent objects occurs (McClelland, 1978; Turvey, 1973).
The second type of masking involves closely adjacent but non-overlapping contours
and is called metacontrast-masking (Averbach & Coriell, 1961; Fehrer & Raab, 1962). It
occurs when the shapes of the mask closely fit but do not overlap with the contours of
the target. Metacontrast-masking is most effective at intermediate SOAs (40-80ms). At
very short or very long target-mask SOAs the target becomes clearly visible. The cause
of this type of masking is thought to include inhibitory interactions between neurons that
represent the contours of the target and the mask (Breitmeyer, 1984; Weisstein, Ozog
& Szoc, 1975). If the separation between target and masking contours is even slightly
increased masking is reliably reduced.
The third type of masking, object-substitution masking, was discovered more recently
(Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Enns & Di Lollo, 1997). Here, masking is produced
by flanking the target by four dots corresponding to the corners of an imaginary square
surrounding the target. Both stimuli (target and mask) are presented simultaneously. If
the offset of the dots is delayed relative to the target offset the accuracy in identifying
the target drops. Maximum impairment in target discrimination occurs at offset delays
of approximately 100-150 ms. Object-substitution masking seems to involve higher-level
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attentional and object-recognition mechanisms. Di Lollo et al. (2000) argue that mask-
ing by the surrounding dots occurs because a percept, which is based on the four dots,
displaces the still developing percept of the target (the dots object induced by the dots
substitute the target shape). According to the object-substitution-theory, masking is a
consequence of ongoing recurrent communication between neurons at lower and higher
levels of processing. Sensory input (e.g., a circle) activates receptive fields of lower level
units which then activate units at a higher levels responsible for object-representation
(feed-forward-sweep). To bind patterns to spatiotemporal locations and to resolve ambi-
guity between alternative object activations, a feedback sweep of processing is required
to compare the patterns generated at higher levels of processing with ongoing activity at
the lower level. If the visual image remains the same during this comparison process the
system will become stable in its representation of a given stimulus pattern (e.g., the circle)
will become ”conscious”. If the input activity is changed (i.e., if four dots appear) before
the comparison is complete, a mismatch will be detected and the comparison process will
begin again based on the new sensory input (the dots), leading to an inability to identify
the first stimulus (e.g., the circle).
2.3.2 Effects of visual masking
With the types of masking described above different behavioral effects can be obtained.
One dependent variable which can be studied is accuracy of target discrimination. Here,
the question of interest is under which conditions observers are unable to identify the
target. More frequently, however, visual masking is used to examine the influence of sub-
liminal stimuli (primes) on the processing of subsequent supraliminal stimuli (targets). For
instance, Neumann & Klotz (1994) used diamond- and square-shaped objects as impera-
tive stimuli. The task for the participants was to press, for instance, a left key as quickly
and accurately as possible whenever the square appears and a right key if a diamond ap-
pears. Shortly before target onset, a prime stimulus was presented for a short duration.
The prime could either be a smaller version of one of the two target shapes (diamond or
square) or a mixture of both stimuli (neutral prime). The size and the shapes of the prime
and target stimuli were such that the targets served as metacontrast masks for the primes
(see page 18). Three prime-target pairs were used on different trials: response-compatible
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pairs, where the prime and the target had the same shape and were therefore mapped
to the same response; response-incompatible pairs (prime and target had different shapes
and were mapped to different responses); and neutral pairs (a neutral prime not mapped
to any response was followed by diamond or square as target). The results showed that
participants responded faster to targets if the prime stimulus had the same shape as the
target and was thus mapped to the same response (i.e., compatible trials). When primes
and targets were mapped to different responses (i.e., incompatible trials), RTs were in-
creased relative to neutral and compatible prime-target pairs (Neumann & Klotz, 1994).
Neumann & Klotz (1994) interpreted their results as an effect of direct links between
visual information and response parameters without mediation by conscious perception
(”direct parameter specification”). The idea is, that in the instruction (and throughout
the experiment via practice) an association between response parameters (left, right) and
visual information (target shapes, diamond and square) is formed. If now these shapes
are presented subliminally in the experiment (i.e., as primes), they automatically trigger
the response mapped to them. This response triggering is advantageous on compatible
trials because the response which has to be executed has already been partially activated
by the prime. On incompatible trials RT costs occur because the prime initially activated
the ”wrong” response. Similar results have been observed with a number of different
paradigms (e.g., Debner & Jocoby, 1994; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Marcel, 1980;
McCormick, 1997; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). The effect that RTs are shortest with com-
patible prime-target pairs is called positive compatibility effect (PCE). The PCE is usually
observed if the time between the onset of the prime and the target is short (<50 ms).
Recently, an effect opposite to the PCE has been observed that may appear coun-
terintuitive at first sight (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Praamstra
& Seiss, 2005). This effect is named negative compatibility effect (NCE) and refers to the
finding that RTs are shorter with incompatible prime - target pairs compared to compati-
ble conditions. A possible sequence of events in an NCE study is as follows: First, a prime
(e.g., square or diamond) is very briefly presented (<35 ms). Second, a visual pattern
mask (e.g., a composite of the two prime patterns) is presented over the prime location
for about 100 ms. Finally, a target (e.g., square or diamond) is presented and participants
are asked to report its identity as fast and accurately as possible. Equal to the design by
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Neumann & Klotz (1994) response-compatible, response-incompatible, or response-neutral
prime-target pairs are possible. Is the duration of the mask short (<30 ms; i.e., at short
prime - target SOAs), positive priming effects (PCE) are observed. The NCE usually oc-
curs when the duration of the mask exceeds 50 ms (i.e., with longer prime - target SOAs).
Two explanations for this effect can be found in the literature. The first one is that a mo-
tor pattern, which has been activated by the masked prime (without conscious awareness,
due to e.g., a direct specification of response parameters by its sensory information; Neu-
mann & Klotz, 1994) is automatically inhibited later on (activation-followed-by-inhibition
hypothesis) (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Klapp & Haas, 2005).
Depending on the time interval between prime and target, the inhibition phase may coin-
cide with preparation of the required response and lead to a reversal of positive RT priming
effects. Under incompatible conditions (where prime and target are mapped to different
responses), this inhibition is advantageous because the initial ”incorrect” response acti-
vated by the prime is inhibited, allowing a fast activation of the ”correct” response and
leading to shorter RTs. For compatible trials, however, longer prime-target intervals lead
to RT costs because the response activated by the prime it already the ”correct” one and
its subsequent inhibition leads to a delayed re-activation when the target is processed. The
prime-induced motor activation and the subsequent inhibition phase are also distinguish-
able in movement-related electroencephalographic (EEG) activity (Eimer & Schlaghecken,
1998, 2003; see Figure 2.4). By computing the lateralized readiness potential (LRP; see
2.3.3, page 26 for details), an indicator of response activation, Eimer and Schlaghecken
(1998) were able to show that the subliminal primes initially activated their corresponding
responses abound 200 ms after prime-onset (the A in Figure 2.4). This initial response
activation is reversed after approximately 100 ms (the I in Figure 2.4) in an interval in
which the target was identified and the appropriate response selected.
Why should an unconsciously activated response be automatically inhibited? Eimer
and Schlaghecken (1998) suggest that response activation processes are generally subject
to inhibition if a partial response activation is not immediately followed by response ex-
ecution. One alternative explanation is, that the inhibition occurred because the primes
were immediately (SOA = 16 ms) followed by the mask which suddenly removed any
sensory information about the prime leading to an interruption of any ongoing response
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Figure 2.4: The LRP obtained in a subliminal priming task with longer (>50 ms) prime-
target SOAs for compatible (black line), neutral (gray), and incompatible (dotted line) tri-
als. The (A) indicates partial prime-consistent response activation (e.g., the primes activated the response
assigned to them in the instruction). This activation phase is followed by response inhibition (I). Upward-
going (negative) deflections represents incorrect response activation (i.e., activation opposite to the exe-
cuted response) and downward-going (positive) deflections indicate correct response activation (activation
in the direction of the executed response; adapted from Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2003).
activation processes by the visiomotor system (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Milner &
Goodale, 1995).
The second explanation for the NCE is based on the assumption of object-substi-
tution (see 2.3.1, page 18 for details on the object-substitution-hypothesis; Lleras & Enns,
2004). The NCE can arise in this view because of an updating process involving the prime
- mask sequence. First, the prime stimulus (e.g., square or diamond) is processed leading
to a hypothesis about the prime (e.g., ”a square”) at higher processing levels. Immediately
thereafter this hypothesis is tested by reentrant processing. If a mask has appeared in the
meantime, which shares some features with the prime (e.g., a composite of square and
diamond), a partial mismatch will be detected and processing will begin again this time
based on the presentation of the mask. If the mask remains on the screen for a certain
period of time (>50 ms) the comparison of the pattern hypothesized at higher processing
levels and the stimulus at lower levels will result in a match. The important point con-
cerning the NCE is that most object updating will include features newly introduced by
the mask. If the mask is a composite of the two prime shapes (e.g., square and diamond)
new mask-features (e.g., diamond features after a square prime) will determine the prim-
ing effect. This would lead to shorter RTs for incompatible prime - target pairs because
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 24
the mask activates the percept (and via direct parameter specification presumably the
associated response) of the other prime-opposite but target-consistent stimulus. Following
this logic, a mask which does not share any features with the prime (e.g., random noise
masks) should not induce the opposite percept and response and therefore not lead to a
NCE. This is exactly what Lleras and Enns (2004) found. One critical point about their
experiments is that the primes remained not entirely unconscious when a random noise
mask was used. A mask which is a mixture of the prime shapes has much better masking
abilities. Since Eimer and Schlaghecken (2002) found that supraliminal primes do not
produce NCE, the results of Lleras and Enns (2004) could also be explained in terms of
the different prime visibilities depending on the mask (e.g., random noise masks do not
mask efficiently enough, therefore no NCE is observed; composite masks reduce prime
visibility much better and therefore lead to NCEs).
The effects reported so far have all been observed in pure forced-choice tasks. There
have been few studies investigating the PCE and NCE in free-choice tasks (Klapp &
Hinkley, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Klapp & Haas, 2005). Since the experiments
conducted in this dissertation involve free-choice tasks the question of whether and how
subliminal primes influence response selection and execution in such tasks is of impor-
tance. Kiesel, Wagener, Kunde, Hoffmann, Fallgatter, & Stöcker (in press) investigated
the PCE in a mixed forced- and free-choice metacontrast priming experiment (i.e., forced-
and free-choice trials were presented within a block). For both trial types left and right
pointing arrows served as primes. On forced-choice trials participants were asked to press
a left key in response to a left arrow and the right key in response to a right arrow. The
experiment included compatible and incompatible trials. Whenever a double pointing
arrow appeared participants were instructed to freely choose one of the two responses.
Participants could either choose the primed response (compatible choice) or the unprimed
response (incompatible choice). The results showed shorter RTs for compatible- relative
to incompatible trials (PCE) for the forced-choice and, importantly, also for free-choice
condition. Additionally, a response bias in the sense of reliably more prime-compatible
responses choices was found in the free-choice blocks. These findings show that externally
presented unconscious stimuli are strong enough to influence free-choice behavior. Ac-
cordingly, in NCE paradigms using mixed forced- and free-choice blocks opposite results
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as in PCE paradigms should be observed. Indeed, RTs are shorter for incompatible trials
as compared to compatible trials on forced-choice trials and more prime-incompatible re-
sponses are chosen on free-choice trials (Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer,
2004). Interestingly, on pure free-choice blocks (block which contained only free-choice tri-
als) no significant response bias (i.e., equal prime-compatible and -incompatible choices)
was observed (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Klapp & Haas, 2005). The likely function of
the intermixed forced-choice trials in mixed blocks seems to be the activation of bonds
between specific stimuli and specific responses. This activation must occur during the
tested block of trials in order to obtain a NCE on free-choice trials. The authors suggest
that the NCE on free-choice trials only occurs if unmasked visible targets enhance the
attention to the masked primes on these trials (Klapp & Haas, 2005). Schlaghecken and
Eimer (2004) argue that inhibition of an activated response under free-choice conditions is
only possible if a task-set (i.e., a certain stimulus-response mapping) is active at the time
of task performance which was only the case in mixed forced- and free-choice blocks.
A fundamental question which needs to be addressed when talking about visual
masking and subliminal priming is how one can assess whether or not stimuli are per-
ceived with or without awareness. In subliminal priming studies control tasks have to
be conducted to investigate whether observers are indeed unaware of the stimuli. Basi-
cally, two methods of measuring awareness can be distinguished: Subjective and objective
measures (see Merikle & Reingold, 1998; Reingold & Merikle, 1990; Merikle, Smilek, &
Eastwood, 2001 for an overview). Subjective measures are based on self-reports. A typi-
cal instruction for participants is to indicate whether they saw any stimuli (e.g., ”Did you
see which figure was presented?”; Sides, 1898; Williams, 1938). With objective measures
of awareness observers have to discriminate between alternative stimulus states (forced-
choice-discrimination tasks, e.g., ”Which stimulus did you see? A diamond or a square?”).
Successful discriminations between alternative stimuli indicate awareness, whereas failures
to discriminate indicates an absence of awareness (Marcel, 1980, 1883). It has been sug-
gested that in many contexts subjective and objective measures of awareness assess the
same underlying conscious experience of perceiving (Merikle et al., 2001).
Most experiments conducted in this thesis use the electroencephalogram (EEG) for
electrophysiological measures. More specifically, the lateralized readiness potential (LRP),
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a component which can be derived from the EEG is used as in indicator of response
activation processes. It is therefore necessary, to discuss the LRP in more detail for a
better understanding of the experiments and results of this dissertation.
2.3.3 The lateralized readiness potential (LRP)
The electroencephalogram (EEG) is one of the most important methods to investigate
the connection of behavior and brain mechanisms. It is the record of the rhythmical
change of electrical activity in the brain, which can be continuously measured at the scalp.
Embedded in the spontaneous EEG are neural responses associated with specific sensory,
cognitive, and motor events. Using a simple averaging technique it is possible to extract
these responses from the spontaneous EEG. These specific responses are called event-
related potentials (ERPs) because they are associated with specific events. Probably the
biggest advantage of using ERPs in cognitive neuroscience is their high temporal resolution
which provides a continuous measure of processing between the onset of a stimulus and the
response to it. ERPs can be recorded on-line and continuously while cognitive processes
are operating and thus can provide temporal information about the functional organization
of information processing.
One event related component derived from the EEG is of special interest in this the-
sis - the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), which is assumed to be related to selective
response activation processes (Eimer, 1998). The first to describe movement-related brain
potentials in general were Kornhuber and Deecke (1965). They observed an increasing
negative shift starting about 1 s before the onset of a hand movement. This so-called Bere-
itschaftspotential (readiness potential, RP) is at first equally large over both hemispheres
(i.e., symmetrical). Physiological studies have shown that the RP is generated in the pri-
mary motor cortex and in the supplementary motor areas (SMA) of both hemispheres (cf.
Arezzo & Vaughan, 1975; Ikeda, Lüders, Burgess, & Shibasaki, 1992; Okada, Williamson,
& Kaufman, 1982). About 700 ms before movement onset the RP begins to lateralize (i.e.,
it becomes asymmetrical). The amplitude over the hemisphere contralateral to the side of
a to-be-executed movement becomes more negative than the amplitude over the ipsilateral
hemisphere. This lateralization is maximal for recording sites above the motor cortex and
becomes smaller for more anterior and superior sites. Therefore, recording sites for the
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LRP should lie above central or fronto-central scalp location over the motor cortex (i.e.,
close to the electrode sites C3 and C4; see Figure 3.7, page 49 for the location of different
EEG recording sites). The onset of the lateralization of the RP (i.e., the LRP-onset)
reflects the point in time at which the response side (right vs. left hand) is determined
(Kutas & Donchin, 1980). The LRP is considered to reflect the activation of response-
related processes following stimulus-related processing (i.e., the relative activation level
of left hand and right hand response tendencies) (Coles, 1989; de Jong, Wierda, Mulder,
& Mulder, 1988; Eimer, 1998; Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988). It
has been applied in the investigation of a number of processes, including the transmis-
sion between perception- and response-related processes, motor programming, overlapping
task processing, or dual route processing in spatial stimulus response compatibility (e.g.,
Coles, Gratton, & Donchin, 1988; Miller & Hackley, 1992; Leuthold, Sommer, & Ulrich,
1996; Osman & Moore, 1993; Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schroter, & Sommer, 2002;
Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). It has been shown that different parameters
of the LRP indicate different cognitive processes (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, & Hoormann,
1994). For instance, LRP-onset seems to be more closely time-related to central decision
processes, whereas the peak of the LRP is thought to be more closely related to the actual
response (i.e., to central motor processes).
The LRP can be computed on the basis of stimulus-locked averaged waveforms (i.e.,
time-locked to the appearance of a stimulus) as well as on the basis of response-locked
averages (i.e., time-locked to the response). In stimulus-locked LRPs, latency measures
indicate the time between stimulus onset and specific LRP deflections (e.g., LRP-onset).
In response-locked LRPs, these latency measures refer to the distance in time between
an LRP deflection and the overt response. Response-locked LRP onset latency reflects
the duration of processes that take place between LRP-onset and response execution.
The onset latency of the stimulus-locked LRP is determined by cognitive processes that
occur prior to the selective activation of a response. Therefore, pre-motor processes (i.e.,
influences of stimuli on the decision between response alternatives) are mostly evident in
the stimulus-locked LRP (Mordkoff & Gianaros, 2000).
Several methods to calculate the LRP are available (Eimer, 1998). The method
used in this dissertation for deriving the (stimulus-locked) LRP is shown in Figure 2.5.
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It illustrates the so-called averaging method with the formula [(C4 - C3)left hand + (C3 -
C4)right hand ] / 2 (Coles, 1989; Gratton et al., 1988). Here, the LRP is calculated in two
steps. First, the ERP waveforms recorded over motor areas ipsilateral to the responding
hand are subtracted from ERP waveforms obtained over motor areas contralateral to
it. These subtractions are performed separately for left hand and right hand responses
(see figure caption of Figure 2.5 for details). The resulting two difference waveforms are
averaged, and the averaged waveform is the LRP. With this method, an activation of a
correct response (i.e., activation of the response mapped to or associated with the target)
is reflected in the LRP by negative deflections, whereas positive LRP amplitudes reflect
incorrect response activation (i.e., activation of a response which was not assigned to a
target).
It is important to note, that the LRP is independent of actual overt response ex-
ecution. It has also been found following pre-cues that predicted the likely side of the
upcoming response (Gehring, Grattion, Coles, & Donchin, 1992) as well as on NoGo-trials
in so-called Go/NoGo tasks where stimuli can either call for a response (Go-trials) or
signal that overt responding has to be suppressed (NoGo-trials)(Miller & Hackley, 1992).
Furthermore, the LRP has been found following subliminal primes (Eimer & Schlaghecken,
1998; see 2.3.2 for details). Because stimulus-triggered response activation is also evident
if no response has to be executed following the stimulus, the LRP is often referred to as
an index of partial response activation. It should also be noted that because the LRP is a
relative small component a rather large number of single trials is needed to for averaging
to obtain reliable waveforms. Eimer (1998) suggested that at least 40-50 trials should be
included in the averaged ERP waveforms for both left hand and right hand stimuli.
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Figure 2.5: Computation of the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) using the averaging
method. Top panels: Possible waveforms elicited at C3 (an electrode positioned over the left motor
cortex; black line) and C4 (an electrode positioned over the right motor cortex; gray line) in response to
stimuli requiring left hand responses (left panel) and right hand responses (right panel). Middle panel:
Difference waveforms obtained by subtracting the waveforms elicited at electrodes located ipsilateral to
the responding hand from those located contralateral to the responding hand (i.e., C4 - C3 for the left
hand responses (black line) and C3 - C4 for the right hand responses (gray line)). Bottom panel:
The difference waveforms for the two response sides are averaged. For the resulting final LRP waveform
negative (downward-going) deflections indicate correct (i.e., target-consistent) response activation and
positive (upward-going) deflections indicate incorrect (target-inconsistent) response activation.
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2.4 Aim of the thesis
The first objective of this thesis was to provide further evidence for the ideomotor view
of action control according to which anticipating action-effect features leads to an auto-
matic activation of associated motor codes. The main goal was to show that subliminally
presented action-effect stimuli can activate associated response codes although they have
not been consciously perceived. To this end, a new approach involving electrophysiological
measures (the LRP) in combination with behavioral studies (subliminal priming of actions
effects in a free-choice task) was taken.
A secondary aim was to study the role of emotional features of action-effects on
action control. Does the emotional valence of an action-effect automatically become in-
tegrated into the action representation? To answer this question I examined whether the
emotional valence (negative vs. positive) of anticipated action-effects exerts a bias on freely
chosen actions.
Chapter 3
Experimental work
The purpose of the experiments reported here was to investigate if subliminally presented
action-effect features can automatically activate associated motor codes. Specifically, I
was interested in the question whether this unconscious response activation elicited by
subliminally presented action-effects can influence free-choice actions, a question which
has not been fully answered to date. The empirical part consists of five experiments,
which aim to yield further insight into the role of action-effects in action control.
To investigate whether subliminally presented action-effects can trigger their asso-
ciated responses I employed a paradigm similar to one used by Elsner and Hommel (2001;
Exp. 2a). Their experiment was divided into two experimental phases - an acquisition-
phase and a test-phase. During the acquisition-phase response - effect (R-E) associations
were established (between key-press responses and effect-tones), similar to the first stage
of the two stage model described in the theoretical background (see 2.1.2, page 4). Imme-
diately after the acquisition-phase the free-choice test-phase was conducted. During the
test-phase the authors investigated if the presentation of the former action-effect tones in-
fluences free-choice responses. They found, that participants executed significantly more
with acquisition-phase consistent key-presses, which indicates that auditory action-effects
can automatically activate the response codes associated with them 1. Elsner and Hom-
mel (2001) concluded that the effect-tones automatically activated the associated response
1Acquisition-consistent means, that the chosen and executed response was the one which has been
associated with the prime tone in the acquisition-phase. If the alternative response was chosen (i.e., the
one not primed by the tone) the trial type is called acquisition-inconsistent ; see also Figure 3.1, page 34).
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codes thus leading to more acquisition-consistent key-presses. One critical point about the
experiments of Elsner and Hommel (2001) is that their effect stimuli were presented above
the threshold of awareness. Therefore, participants could in principle use a conscious
response strategy, like always pressing a certain key if a certain stimulus appears. If
participants were using such deliberate strategies, this would call into question that the
response bias obtained in the test-phase was due to automatic response activation by
the effect-tones. As noted above, the question if the prime-induced anticipation of action-
effect features has to be conscious in order to activate associated motor codes has not been
fully answered to date. In the following experiments, subliminal priming paradigms were
applied to investigate this question. If the unconscious (i.e., subliminal) presentation of
former action-effect features influences free response choices, one can assume that response
activation by effect anticipation is indeed an automatic process, since the possibility of
conscious response strategies would be reduced or even eliminated.
It has been shown numerous times in forced-choice reaction tasks that subliminal
visual stimuli can trigger responses mapped to them by instruction (Neumann & Klotz,
1994; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003; see 2.3.2, page 20 for details). Recently, it has also
been shown that stimuli, which are presented below the threshold of awareness can trigger
assigned responses on free-choice trials in mixed forced- and free-choice blocks (Kiesel
et al., in press; Klapp & Hinckley, 2002; Klapp & Haas, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer,
2004). First evidence that the presentation of former action-effects which did not reach
awareness can activate associated responses stems from a study by Kunde (2004). He
showed that if simple key-presses are associated with visual action-effects in a first stage,
these action-effects can, if presented subliminally, influence performance in a forced-choice
reaction task in a second stage. However, it has not been shown so far that unconscious
action-effect features can activate associated responses in a free-choice task. Experiment
1 was designed to investigate this issue.
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3.1 Experiment 1: Unconscious response priming by action-
effects I: Behavioral evidence.
3.1.1 Introduction
Experiment 1 consisted of four parts. In the first part - the acquisition-phase - right
and left key-presses were followed by contingent visual action-effects (square or diamond
shapes) in order to establish response-effect (R-E) associations. In accordance with ideo-
motor theories of action-control (see 2.1.2, page 4 for details) I assumed that an association
between the actions (key-presses) and their immediate sensory effects will be established
automatically. To test whether unconscious action-effect features can activate their associ-
ated responses, the second experimental part - the free-choice test-phase - was conducted.
During the free-choice test-phase the same stimuli which had served as action-effects dur-
ing the acquisition-phase were presented as subliminal primes. If an association between
the responses and their immediate sensory effects has been formed, the mere presentation
of the action-effects should automatically activate the response code associated with this
effect, at least to a certain degree (i.e., partial response activation). Since response priming
by action-effects is thought to be an automatic process it should also become evident with
subliminally presented effect-primes. In particular, response priming by subliminal action-
effects should influence the subsequent response choice between responses. If, as assumed,
unconsciously presented effect-primes partially activate their associated motor patterns,
there should be significantly more acquisition-phase-consistent key-choices (see Figure 3.1
for a description of what is meant by acquisition-phase-consistent and -inconsistent key-
choices), similar to the results obtained by Elsner and Hommel (2001; Exp. 2a). If for
instance a left key-press was associated with the square stimulus in the acquisition-phase
the subliminal presentation of a square as the effect-prime in the test-phase should lead
to more left than right free-choice responses (Figure 3.1).
After the free-choice test-phase participants were administered a short questionnaire
to examine whether or not they had subjectively noticed or recognized the masked effect-
primes or if they could make any command on the purpose and procedure of the experiment
(subjective measure of awareness; see 2.3.2, page 20). The third experimental part was a
forced-choice priming task, which was conducted to investigate whether the masked prime
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Figure 3.1: The possible trial-types in the free-choice test-phase. Depending on the response
the prime stimulus was associated with in the acquisition phase there could be acquisition-consistent or
acquisition-inconsistent key-choices in the free-choice test-phase (see text for details).
stimuli used in the test-phase can generally influence behavior under conditions usually
employed in experiments of unconscious response priming. In the forced-choice priming
task the action-effect stimuli from the acquisition-phase were used as imperative stim-
uli (target) and participants were asked to press a particular key after the appearance
of these targets as quickly and accurately as possible (e.g., ”Press the right key if the
diamond appears and a left key if the square appears.”). Shortly before the target stim-
ulus a masked prime was presented (one of the two effect-primes from the test-phase and
one additional response-neutral prime). With this design response-compatible, response-
incompatible, and neutral prime-target pairs were possible. Participants should response
faster to compatible prime-target pairs as compared to trials were prime and target were
completely different stimuli and therefore were mapped to different responses (i.e., incom-
patible). This result would indicate that the primes activated the response which has been
mapped to them in the instruction and that this activation is strong enough to influence
the behavioral performance (Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003).
To obtain an objective measure of prime detection (see 2.3.2, page 20 for a com-
parison of subjective and objective measures of prime awareness) the fourth and final
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experimental part - the prime discrimination task - was conducted. The task was almost
identical to the free-choice test-phase. One of the effect-primes from the acquisition-phase
was presented shortly and immediately masked. After the mask a Go-signal appeared and
participants were asked to indicate which prime stimulus was presented on each given trial
prior to the mask (i.e., to give a prime identification judgement). If the primes are not
correctly identified above chance level in this task one can assume that they did not reach
awareness even according to a conservative forced-choice criterion (cf. Merikle & Reingold,
1998).
3.1.2 Method
Participants
Twenty-eight volunteers (students from the University of Technology Dresden; age range
18-42 years; 19 female) participated in all four parts of Experiment 1. All participants
were näıve to the experimental setting and reported normal or corrected to normal vision.
None of the participants had a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. They were
either paid 5 Euro per hour or received course credit for their participation.
Stimuli, procedure, and design
For all experiments a PC computer attached to a VGA color monitor with a refresh
rate of 75 Hz was used for stimulus presentation. All experiments were performed using
Presentation R© software (Version 0.80, www.neurobs.com). For all experiments the re-
sponse keys were the ’Y’ key (left response) and the ’-’ key (right response) on a standard
German computer keyboard. Participants were instructed to use their left and right index
finger for response execution. All experiments were analyzed using SPSS 11.5 for statisti-
cal analysis and Vison Analyzer (BrainProducts, Munich) for EEG data analysis.
Acquisition-phase
The stimuli and timing of the acquisition-phase are shown in Figure 3.2. The action-effect
stimuli consisted of two black shapes, a square and a diamond, which were presented on
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a white background at the center of the monitor screen. The two shapes extended 1.8 cm
in width and heights (at a viewing distance of 60 cm this corresponds to ∼1.720 of visual
angle). The fixation cross was black and extended 1 cm in width and heights.
Each trial of the acquisition-phase started with the presentation of the fixation cross
accompanied by a tone (800 Hz) which served as a Go-signal. Participants were instructed
to press one of the two possible keys on the computer keyboard (left or right) with their
index finger in response to the Go-signal. They were told that it did not matter for the
task which of the two keys they pressed on each given trial. They were instructed to press
both keys approximately equally often. 50 ms after the key press an action-effect stimulus,
which was contingent on the executed response appeared at the center of the screen. For
half of the participants a left key-press was followed by the diamond and a right key-press
by the square (and vice versa for the other half). The action-effect stayed on the screen
for 500 ms and was followed by a blank screen, which was displayed for 1200 ms. Then
a new trial started. The participants were not informed about the purpose of the task.
If they asked about the purpose of the effect stimuli they were told that they are needed
for experimental control purposes but were not relevant for the task itself. They were
not explicitly asked to ignore the action-effects. The dependent variable was key-choice
(left, right [%]). The acquisition-phase consisted of 200 trials divided into 4 experimental
blocks with 50 trials each. After each block a short break was allowed. At the beginning
a practice block of 10 trials was given to familiarize the participants with the task.
Free-choice test-phase
Immediately after the acquisition-phase the free-choice test-phase was conducted. The
stimuli and timing are presented in Figure 3.3. The square and diamond shapes used
as action-effects in the acquisition-phase served as effect-primes in the test-phase. Both
primes extended 1.2 cm in width and heights (∼1.140 visual angle). The mask was a
composit of the two prime shapes and extended ∼1.720 of visual angle. The Go-signal
consisted of the same cross and tone used in the acquisition-phase.
Each trial of the test-phase started with the presentation of an effect-prime (square
or diamond) at the center of the screen for 32 ms. After the offset of the prime a blank
screen appeared for 32 ms and then the mask was displayed for 32 ms. Immediately after
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Action-Effect 500 ms
Free-Choice Response
Go-Signal
Blank 50 ms
+
Figure 3.2: The sequence of events during a trial of the acquisition-phase of Experiment 1.
In reaction to a Go-signal participants had to freely choose to press one of two possible response keys. 50
ms after the key-press and contingent on it, a visual action-effect appeared.
the offset of the mask the cross and the tone were presented simultaneously serving as
a Go-signal. Participants were instructed to freely choose to press one of the two keys
already known from the acquisition-phase in response to the Go-signal. They were asked
not to think about which of the two possible keys they wanted to press in advance but
instead to react as spontaneously and fast as possible. The test-phase consisted of 10
practice trials and 100 experimental trials divided into two blocks. The two effect-primes
were presented in a randomized order with the constraint that each prime appeared 50
times. The dependent variable was key-choice [%]. There could be either acquisition-
consistent or acquisition-inconsistent key-choices depending on the prime presented prior
to the key-press (see Figure 3.1, page 34).
Questionnaire
After the free-choice test-phase participants filled out a short questionnaire to investigate
whether they were subjectively able to identify the prime-stimuli (see appendix C).
Forced-choice priming task
The stimuli and timing of the forced-choice priming task are presented in Figure 3.4. The
primes and the mask were identical to those used in the free-choice test-phase. Addition-
ally, a neutral prime (a star shaped overlay of the two other primes, identical to a smaller
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or
Free-Choice Response
Go-Signal
Mask 16 ms
Blank 32 ms
Effect Prime  32 ms
Figure 3.3: The sequence of events in a trial of the free-choice test-phase of Experiment
1. After a Go-signal participants were asked to freely choose to press one of two possible response keys.
Unknown to them, one of the action-effect stimuli from the acquisition-phase was presented and masked
before each Go-signal.
version of the mask) extending ∼1.140 of visual angle was introduced. The target stimuli
were the square and diamond shapes used as action-effects in the acquisition-phase.
Each trial started with the randomized presentation of one of the three prime stimuli
for 32 ms. After the offset of the prime a blank screen appeared for 32 ms followed by
the mask (for 16 ms). Right after the offset of the mask one of the two target stimuli
(square or diamond) appeared at the center of the screen for 100 ms. The participants
who had received a square as action-effect after pressing the left key in the acquisition-
phase were instructed to press the left key as fast and as accurately as possible whenever
the target was a square (and the right key if the target was a diamond). The remaining
participants received the opposite target-response mapping which was also in accordance
with the mapping they had received in the acquisition-phase. This was done to avoid
interference from different S-R associations acquired in the acquisition-phase. After re-
sponse execution an inter-trial-interval of 1200 ms started. The independent variable was
(response-) compatibility (compatible, neutral, incompatible). On compatible trials the
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or
Target 100 ms
Mask 16 ms
Blank 32 ms
Prime 32 ms
or
Figure 3.4: The sequence of events in a trial of the forced-choice priming task of Experiment1.
First, a prime was shortly presented and masked. Then a target appeared and participants had to respond
to it as quickly as possible according to a rule assigned to them in the instruction.
prime and the target had the same shape and were therefore mapped to the same re-
sponse; on incompatible trials prime and the target had different shapes and were thus
mapped to different responses, and on neutral trials the prime was not mapped to any
response. The task consisted of 192 trials divided into 3 experimental blocks of 64 trials
each (there were 20 additional practice trials at the beginning). After each block a short
break was allowed. Each response compatibility condition was instantiated by 64 trials.
The dependent variables were RT [ms] and error rate [%].
Prime discrimination task
In the prime discrimination task exactly the same stimuli and timing were used as in the
free-choice test-phase (Figure 3.5), but subjects had to perform a different task. In the
instruction subjects were informed that before each mask one of two prime stimuli would
appear very briefly and that these primes would be very hard to identify. After the appear-
ance of the Go-signal participants were asked to indicate which prime stimulus they had
perceived prior to the mask - a square or a diamond. Participants were allowed to guess
when they felt unable to identify the prime. Half of the subjects were instructed to press
the left key if they identified a square and the right key if it was a diamond (and vice versa
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+
or
Diamond or square ?
Go-Signal
Mask 16 ms
Blank 32 ms
Effect Prime 32 ms
Figure 3.5: The sequence of events in a trial of the prime discrimination task of Experiment
1. First, one of the effect-primes was shortly presented and masked. After a Go-signal, participants had
to indicate which prime stimulus was presented before the mask.
for the other half; for each participant the response mapping was in accordance with the
mapping of the acquisition-phase and forced-choice priming task). The task was divided
into 2 experimental blocks (50 randomized trials per block; each effect-prime appeared 50
times). At the beginning 10 practice trials were administered. The dependent variable
was the proportion of correctly identified primes [%].
3.1.3 Results
Acquisition-phase
The mean key-choice frequency was computed (i.e., how many times each of the two pos-
sible response keys was chosen). There was no reliable difference between the frequencies
with which the two keys had been chosen (51.6% [Standard error of mean (SE mean)
1.0] vs. 48.4% [SE mean 1.0] , (t(27) = 1.61, p > .10). Thus the two effect stimuli were
produced approximately equally often.
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Free-choice test-phase
Three subjects had to be excluded because of pressing only one key in reaction to the
Go-signal throughout the task 2. This left 25 subjects for further analysis. Participants
did not execute any response within a time window of 4 s on 5.7% of the trials (these trials
were excluded before further analyses). On average, participants chose the acquisition-
consistent key on 52.8% [SE mean 1.24] and the acquisition-inconsistent key on 47.2% [SE
mean 1.24] of all trials. A two-tailed paired t-test revealed this difference to be significant
(t(24) = 2.28, p < .05).
An analysis of the RTs revealed no significant difference between acquisition-consistent
and -inconsistent trials (212 ms [SE mean 11.4] vs. 209 ms [SE mean 11.1] for consistent
and inconsistent trials, respectively; t(24) = .893, p > .50). A further analysis in which
all subjects who responded with an obvious strategy were excluded was conducted. Ten
more subjects pressed the two response keys more or less alternating. The exclusion of
these subjects did not change the basic results. There were significantly more acquisition-
consistent than -inconsistent key choices (53.43% [SE mean 1.5] vs. 46.57% [SE mean 1.5],
t(14) = 2.28, p < .04) and no difference in the RTs (222 ms [SE mean 12.7] vs. 221 ms
[SE mean 11.8] for consistent and inconsistent trials, respectively; t (14) = .172, p > .80).
Questionnaire
None of the subjects correctly identified the purpose of the task nor did any subject cor-
rectly report the shape of the primes. Most participants did not notice the existence of
the primes at all.
Forced-choice priming task
Mean RTs of correct responses for each condition are presented in Figure 3.6. RT outliers
(RTs faster than 100 ms and slower than 2000 ms and RTs which deviated above or below
an absolute value of z = +/- 2.0 compared to the mean; 1.8% of all trials) and trials on
which a response error was made (2.1% of all trials) were excluded before further anal-
2Including these participants did not change the results (52.52% [SE mean 1.16] acquisition-consistent
key-choices, 47.49% [SE mean 1.16] acquisition-inconsistent key-choices; t(27) = 2.16, p < .05. The same
was true for the RTs (208 ms [SE mean 10.4] vs. 206 ms [SE mean 10.1] for consistent and inconsistent
key-choices, respectively; p > .60)
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ysis. The RTs were analyzed by means of a within-subjects repeated measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with the the factor compatibility (compatible, neutral, incompati-
ble). The analysis revealed a significant main effect (F (2,48) = 15.03, MSe = 260.64, p <
.001). Planned comparisons showed that this effect was due to significantly faster RTs on
compatible trials (485 ms [SE mean 9.9]) as compared to neutral (502 ms [SE mean 10.3],
t(24) = 3.59, p < .001) and incompatible trials (509 ms [SE mean 9.8], t(24) = 4.88, p <
.001). The comparison between neutral and incompatible trials did not reach significance
(t(24) = 1.84, p >.07).
The mean error rates were 1.7% [SE mean .31], 1.9% [SE mean .38] and 2.1% [SE
mean .25] for compatible, neutral and incompatible trials, respectively. An ANOVA with
the factor compatibility (compatible, neutral, incompatible) revealed no significant main
effect (F (2,48) = .08, MSe = 1.19, p <.50).
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Figure 3.6: Mean correct response times (RTs) for compatible (white), neutral (light gray),
and incompatible (dark gray) trials of the forced-choice priming task of Experiment 1. Error
bars show 95% within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
Prime discrimination task
The proportion of correct and incorrect key-presses was calculated for each participant.
On average the primes were correctly identified on 49.9% [SE mean 1.1] of the trials, which
was not significantly different from chance level (t(24) = .018, p > .50).
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3.1.4 Discussion
Experiment 1 aimed to show that subliminally presented action-effects can bias response
choice in a free-choice reaction task. During the acquisition-phase two simple key-press
responses produced visual effects. Both effects were produced equally often, thus it can
be assumed that both R-E associations have been established equally strong. The action-
effects were used as masked primes in the subsequent free-choice test-phase to investigate
whether the subliminal presentation of former action-effects, which are not consciously
perceived, can nevertheless influence free-choice actions. The results of the test-phase
indicate that this was the case. Reliably more acquisition-phase consistent responses
were chosen. In accordance with other authors these results indicate that the actions
(key-press responses) and their immediate sensory effects (visual shapes) were integrated
automatically (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). The most likely interpretation of the response
bias observed in the free-choice test-phase is that the effect-primes automatically activated
their corresponding (associated) motor codes and that this activation was in most cases
sufficient enough to influence subsequent behavior (i.e., response execution). That the ratio
of acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent key-choices is rather small is not surprising. As
noted in the theoretical background (2.1.2, page 4), response priming by effect features
does not necessarily lead to an automatic execution of the activated response because
response activation and response execution are independent stages of the action planning
process (Elsner & Hommel, in press).
The failure of the participants to subjectively (verbal report) and objectively (forced-
choice discrimination) indicate which effect-prime was presented indicates that the primes
did indeed not reach awareness (see 2.3.2 for a details on subjective and objective measures
of awareness). Nevertheless, the same primes systematically influenced performance in a
forced-choice reaction task either by activating the response which was assigned to them
in the instruction (priming at the motor level), or alternatively facilitation encoding and
identification of the target stimulus (i.e., perceptual priming) (cf. Neumann & Klotz, 1994).
Although the results of the test-phase of Experiment 1 show that unconscious action-
effects can influence free-choice responses, the data cannot directly answer the question if
it was prime-induced response activation, which led to this bias. In order to clarify this
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question it is necessary to apply a method that allows one to continuously track the time
course of response activation processes after the presentation of the prime. Therefore,
Experiment 2 was conducted using the electroencephalogram (EEG) and specifically the
lateralized readiness potential (LRP) as an indicator of response activation.
3.2 Experiment 2: Unconscious response priming by action-
effects II: A LRP study.
3.2.1 Introduction
To investigate if the response bias observed in the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 1
was indeed due to automatic response activation by unconscious action-effect primes it is
necessary to use a method which allows one to investigate response activation more directly.
For this reason Experiment 2 was conducted. It consisted of the same four sub-tasks
(acquisition-phase, free-choice test-phase, forced-choice priming task, prime discrimination
task). During the free-choice test-phase and the forced-choice priming task the EEG was
recorded to investigate the time course of the cognitive and motor processes involved in
these tasks. Specifically, we were interested in an event-related potential which can be
isolated from the spontaneous EEG - the LRP, which has been proven to be a reliable
indicator of response activation processes (see 2.3.3, page 26 for details). With the LRP
as an indicator of response activation we are able to investigate whether or not the effect-
primes do indeed activate associated motor codes.
For methodological reasons the design of the test-phase was changed. In a pilot
EEG-study where only Go-trials were included in the test-phase (which was thus identical
to the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 1) some major problems occurred. Because of
the fast response times to the Go-signal it did not become clear from the LRP which part
of the waveform was due to response activation by the primes (prime-related activity) and
which part was caused by the activation of the subsequently executed response (response-
related activity). The stimulus-locked LRP usually starts within a time-window of 150 -
250 ms after stimulus onset, a time window during which a number of the free-choice re-
sponses in the pure Go-trial test-phase have already been executed. This becomes evident
by looking at the RTs of the test-phase of Experiment 1 (mean RT 210 ms). In the pilot
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EEG-study the responses were equally fast (mean RT 206 ms). Fortunately, the response
bias (i.e., more acquisition-consistent than inconsistent key-choices) could be replicated.
Nevertheless, the aim of the EEG experiment was to reveal prime-induced response activa-
tion. Therefore a new paradigm which allowed it to isolate prime-related motor activation
was needed. One possibility is a Go/NoGo paradigm. A study conducted by Schlaghecken
and Eimer (2001) showed that priming effects are not affected by response frequency. They
varied the amount of trials on which a response had to be withheld (NoGo-trials) in com-
parison to trials where a certain response had to be executed (Go-trials). The results
(equally strong priming effects in all conditions) showed that the strength of the priming
effect does not depend on the ratio of Go/NoGo-trials. This indicates that neither the
general ability of masked primes to elicit a partial motor activation nor the specific time
course of this process is influenced by the presence or absence of NoGo-trials. Most im-
portant for the present purpose, adding NoGo-trials to the free-choice test-phase makes
it more likely that the participants wait until the appearance of the Go-signal before ex-
ecuting the response (i.e., there will be less anticipatory responses). The postponing of
the activation of the finally executed response should allow one to get a clearer picture of
motor-related activity induced by the primes. Additionally, the Go/NoGo design could
help the participants to stay focussed on the task. Because more trials are needed in each
conditions, to calculate the LRP, the task could become very tiring. Importantly, it would
also make it less possible that participants decide in advance of the visual display which
response they are going to make if the next Go-signal appears 3. This advance decision
appears more likely in a pure free-choice task because the predetermined response would
always be appropriate. Another interesting aspect that this design allows to investigate
is possible response activation by the primes on the NoGo-trials. It has been shown with
forced-choice reaction paradigms that reliable response activation also takes place on trials
where responses have to be withheld (Hackley & Miller, 1992).
The following predictions can be made for the LRP data of the free-choice test-phase
of Experiment 2: First, prime-related response activation should be visible in the LRP
waveforms starting about 200 ms after prime-onset for the Go- and NoGo-trials. On Go-
3Of course, participants could in principle still apply a response strategy like saying ”When the next
Go-signal appears I will press the right key”.
CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL WORK 46
trials, the acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent LRP waveforms should exhibit different
shapes. On acquisition-consistent trials (on which participants executed the response asso-
ciated with the effect-prime) a prime-induced activation of the consistent response should
be visible starting at about 200 ms after prime-onset. Activation of the consistent response
should then continue to increase until response execution. In contrast, on acquisition-
inconsistent trials (on which participants finally executed the alternative response which
was not associated with the effect-prime) the same initial, prime-induced activation of the
acquisition-consistent response should be visible, which should, however, reverse after some
time leading to an activation of the finally executed acquisition-inconsistent response. In
other words, on acquisition-inconsistent trials an initial activation of the response opposite
to the one executed should be visible. As a control condition the EEG was also recorded
during the forced-choice priming task. Here, the waveform on response-compatible trials
should exhibit a similar shape as the acquisition-consistent waveform on the Go-trials of
the free-choice test-phase. On incompatible trials, an early activation of the incorrect
(alternative) response should be present and then reverse into activation of the correct
response. On neutral trials no prime-related response activation should be visible.
3.2.2 Method
Participants
Twenty-five new, näıve volunteers (age between 19 and 33 [mean age 22.8], 13 females,
all right-handed) participated in Experiment 2. All participants had normal or corrected
to normal vision and reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. They
received either 5 Euro or course credit for their participation.
Stimuli, procedure, and design
The participants were seated in a sound-proof, electrically shielded chamber. The experi-
ment started with the acquisition-phase, followed by the free-choice Go/NoGo-test-phase,
a questionnaire for subjective awareness, the forced-choice priming task, and the prime
discrimination task. It took about 2.5 hours to complete the experiment.
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Acquisition-phase
The stimuli, timing, and design of the acquisition-phase were identical to that of Experi-
ment 1 (Figure 3.2, page 37).
Free-choice test-phase
The stimuli of the test-phase were identical to the ones used in Experiment 1 (Figure 3.3,
page 38). Each trial started with the presentation of an effect-prime for 32 ms which was
followed by a blank screen (32 ms) and a mask (16 ms). In 50% of all trials a cross ap-
peared after the offset of the mask. This was the Go-signal indicating to the participants
to freely choose to press one of the two keys already known from the acquisition-phase.
On the remaining trials a different symbol (#) appeared after the mask. Participants were
instructed not to respond at all whenever this symbol appeared (NoGo-trials). In the case
of a Go-trial the effect stimulus already known from the acquisition-phase (with the same
R-E mapping) appeared after the key-press. This was done to maintain the strength of
the R-E association throughout the test-phase because the larger number of trials could
have led to a weakening of the R-E-binding. The test-phase consisted of 20 practice trials
and six experimental blocks of 56 trials each (336 trials overall; 168 Go-trials, 168 NoGo-
trials). The independent variables were effect-prime (square, diamond) and trial type (Go,
NoGo). The dependent variable were the type of key-choice (acquisition-phase consistent,
acquisition-phase inconsistent) [%] and LRP waveforms [µV].
Questionnaire
After the free-choice test-phase participants filled out a short questionnaire to investigate
whether they were subjectively able to identify the prime-stimuli (see appendix C).
Forced-choice priming task
The stimuli and timing of the forced-choice priming task were identical to that of Exper-
iment 1 (Figure 3.4, page 39). It consisted of 12 blocks with 40 trials each (480 trials
overall; 160 compatible, neutral, and incompatible trials). The independent variable was
response-compatibility (compatible, neutral, incompatible). The dependent variables were
RT [ms], error rate [%], and LRP waveforms [µV].
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Prime discrimination task
The stimuli and timing of the prime discrimination task were identical to those of Ex-
periment 1 (Figure 3.5, page 40). It consisted of 4 experimental blocks of 50 trials each
(200 trials overall). Each effect-prime was presented randomly 100 times. The dependent
variable was key-choice (hit, error) [%].
EEG data acquisition
The EEG was recorded using Ag-AgCl electrodes from 6 positions over the pre-motor
cortex (C3, C4 [according to the 10:20 system (Jaspers, 1958)], C1 [2cm to the right of
C3], C2 [2 cm to the left of C4], FC3 [2 cm in front of C3], FC4 [2cm in front of C4]) and
three additional electrodes (Cz, PO7, PO8). Figure 3.7 shows the position of the electrodes
on the scalp. The vertical electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded from an electrode placed
under the left eye and the horizontal EOG from two electrodes 1 cm external to the outer
canthus of each eye. All recording sites and the right-mastoid were recorded with a left-
mastoid reference electrode and then re-referenced offline to the average of the left and
right mastoid (Nunez, 1981). The EEG and EOG were digitized at a rate of 1000 Hz with
a high-pass filter of 0.016 Hz (time constant = 10 s) and a low-pass filter of 80 Hz by
a PC. All impedances were kept below 5 kΩ throughout the experiment. The EEG was
stored and filtered offline with a low-pass filter of 30 Hz.
EEG data analysis
For the calculation of stimulus-locked (i.e., prime-locked, time 0 = the onset of the prime)
components the EEG-signal was segmented into segments of 700 ms length reaching from
-100 ms pre-stimulus (before prime-onset) to 600 ms post-stimulus (after prime-onset).
The period 100 ms before prime-onset until prime-onset was used as a baseline (the mean
amplitude within this time window was set to zero). After segmentation, artifacts were
rejected after visual inspection or if the maximum voltage in the segment extended +/-
50 µV. After artifact rejection all segment belonging to one condition were averaged.
The LRP was calculated stimulus-locked using the averaging method with the for-
mula [(C4 - C3)left hand + (C3 - C4)right hand ] / 2 (Gratton et al., 1988; Coles, 1989; see
2.3.3, page 26 for details). It is important to explain the different ways the stimulus-locked
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Figure 3.7: The electrode sites used for EEG data acquisition. The sites used in Experiment 2
are shown in gray.
LRP was calculated for the (1) free-choice test-phase and the (2) forced-choice priming
task.
(1) LRP calculation for the free-choice test-phase: For the free-choice test-phase the LRP
was first calculated separately for the Go- and NoGo-trials. Here, the LRP was derived
contingent on the prime which was presented (prime-related LRP). For the prime-related
calculation, the LRP was calculated relative to the response side with which the prime
was associated in the acquisition-phase. In this case left in the LRP formula means
that the prime was associated with the left response in the acquisition-phase and right
means that the prime was associated with the right response; [(C4 - C3)left prime + (C3
- C4)right prime] / 2. Thus a negative-going LRP deflection indicates activation of the
response that was associated with the effect-prime in the acquisition-phase (acquisition-
consistent response activation), whereas a positive-going LRP deflection indicates activa-
tion of the alternative response (acquisition-inconsistent response activation). It is im-
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portant to note that in this analysis, the LRP is computed independently from which
response the participant actually performed. Given that participants chose left and right
responses approximately equally often, the lateralization of the readiness potential for left
and right responses will cancel out in this computation. Any lateralization that will be
seen in the resulting waveforms can thus unequivocally attributed to response activation
elicited by the primes. In particular, I expect that the primes will elicit an early (around
150-250 ms post-prime) activation of the motor response it was associated with in the
acquisition-phase.
In a follow-up analysis the Go-trials were split into whether an acquisition-consistent
or -inconsistent response had been executed. For these two trial types (acquisition-
consistent and acquisition-inconsistent) separate LRP waveforms were calculated but this
time relative to the chosen response (response-related LRP ; see Figure 3.9). Here, left
in the LRP formula means that the left response was executed and right means that the
right response was executed; [(C4 - C3)left response + (C3 - C4)right response]/ 2. In the
resulting LRP waveforms for acquisition-consistent responses, prime-induced response ac-
tivation should be evident in an LRP deflection in the same direction as the final response,
whereas for acquisition-inconsistent responses, prime-induced response activation should
show up in an LRP deflection in the opposite direction as the finally executed response.
For example, if the effect-prime was associated with the left response, but participant
chose to execute the right response, prime-induced response activation should be evident
in an early LRP deflection indicating activation of the left response, which later should
reverse into activation of the actually executed (inconsistent) right response.
(2) LRP calculation for the forced-choice priming task: For the forced-choice priming task
the LRP was first calculated response-related, separately for response-compatible, neutral,
and incompatible trials (see Figure 2.5, page 29; On the figure an example for a compatible
trials is given. On incompatible trials an initial activation of the incorrect response should
be visible around 200 ms. On neutral trials no prime-induced response activation should
be evident). Secondly, the LRP was calculated prime-related (depending on the hand the
prime-stimulus was mapped to in the instruction) including the pooled compatible and
incompatible trials to evaluate overall prime-related response activation (since the neutral
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prime was not mapped to any response, the neutral trials were not included in this cal-
culation). This measure is comparable to the prime-related LRP waveform from the Go-
and NoGo-trials of the free-choice test-phase.
For both tasks (test-phase and forced-choice priming task) the LRP formula was applied
to the electrode pairs C3/C4, FC3/FC4. The activity obtained from these two electrode
pairs was pooled (averaged) and will be referred to as the LRP from now on.
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Figure 3.8: Prime-related computation of the LRP using the averaging method. Top panels:
Possible waveforms elicited at C3 (an electrode positioned over the left motor cortex; black line) and C4
(an electrode positioned over the right motor cortex; gray line) after the presentation of primes associated
with left responses (left panel) and right responses (right panel). Middle panel: Difference waveforms
obtained by subtracting the waveform of C3 from C4 for the prime associated with left (black line) and from
subtracting the waveform of C4 from C3 for the prime associated with right (gray line). Bottom panel:
The difference waveforms are averaged. For the final prime-related LRP waveform negative (downward-
going) deflections indicate prime-consistent (i.e., acquisition-consistent) response activation and positive
(upward-going) deflections indicate prime-inconsistent (i.e., acquisition-inconsistent) response activation.
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Figure 3.9: Response-related computation of the lateralized readiness Potential (LRP) using
the averaging method for the aquisition-consistent and -inconsistent trials of the free-choice
test-phase. Top panels: Possible waveforms elicited at C3 (an electrode positioned over the left motor
cortex; black line) and C4 (an electrode positioned over the right motor cortex; gray line) elicited by left
hand responses (left panel) and elicited by right hand responses (right panel). Middle panel: Difference
waveform obtained by subtracting the waveform of C3 from C4 for the left hand responses (black line)
and subtracting the waveform of C4 from C3 for the right hand responses (gray line). Bottom panel:
The difference waveforms for the two response sides are averaged. For the resulting final LRP waveform
negative (downward-going) deflections indicate activation of the executed response and positive (upward-
going) deflections indicate activation of the alternative response (i.e., the response which was not executed).
Here, an example of an acquisition-consistent trial is given.
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3.2.3 Results
Five participants were excluded before further analyses because they either produced too
many artifacts in the EEG (more than > 30% of all trials had to be removed; 4 participants)
or due to technical errors during EEG recording (1 participant). This left 20 participants
for further analyses.
Behavioral performance
Acquisition-phase
The square stimulus was produced on 50.5% [SE mean 1.2] and the diamond on 49.5%
[SE mean 1.2] of the trials. The difference between these proportions was not significant
(t(19) = .45, p > .60) indicating that the two action-effects were produced equally often.
Free-choice test-phase
For the Go-trials, the mean key-choice frequency and the mean RT was calculated for
acquisition-phase consistent and acquisition-phase inconsistent key-choices. There were
50.0% [SE mean 1.0] acquisition-phase consistent and 50.0% [SE mean 1.0] acquisition-
phase inconsistent key-presses (t(19) = .002, p > .80) and thus no indication of a prime-
induced response bias. The false alarm rate for the NoGo-trials was 0.9%.
RT outliers (criterion described in the result of the forced-choice priming task of Ex-
periment 1; 1.0% of all trials) were removed before further analyses. Acquisition-consistent
responses were executed significantly faster than acquisition-inconsistent responses (473
ms [SE mean 11.4] and 484 ms [SE mean 11.8], respectively; t(19) = 2.71, p < .02).
Questionnaire
None of the subjects correctly identified the purpose of the task nor did any subject cor-
rectly report the shape of the primes. Again, as in Experiment 1 most participants did
not notice the existence of the primes at all.
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Figure 3.10: Mean correct response times (RTs) for compatible (white), neutral (light gray),
and incompatible (dark gray) trials of the forced-choice priming task of Experiment 2. Error
bars show 95 % within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
Forced-choice priming task
The mean RTs for each condition (compatible, incompatible, neutral) are presented in
Figure 3.10. RT outliers (criterion as described above, 1.8% of all trials) and trials on
which a response error was made (1.3% of all trials) were removed from the data. An
ANOVA with the factor response-compatibility (compatible, neutral, incompatible) re-
vealed a significant main effect (F (2,38) = 23.2, MSe = 152.7, p < .001) which was due to
significantly faster RTs on compatible (447 ms [SE mean 9.7]) as compared to neutral (466
ms [SE mean 7.6], t(19) = 5.58, p < .001) and incompatible (473 ms [SE mean 7.1], t(19)
= 5.05, p < .001) trials. The neutral trails were significantly faster than the incompatible
trials (t(19) = 2.37, p < .03).
The mean error rates for compatible, neutral, and incompatible trials were .92% [SE
mean .22], 1.30% [SE mean .26] and 1.62% [SE mean .27], respectively. An ANOVA with
the factor compatibility (compatible, neutral, incompatible) revealed a significant main
effect (F (2,38) = 9.367, MSe = .266, p < .001). Significantly less errors were made on
compatible than on incompatible (t(19) = 3.9, p < .001) and neutral (t(19) = 3.14, p <
.006) trials.
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Prime discrimination task
The primes were not identified above chance level. Participants correctly identified the
primes on 46.5% [SE mean 2.6] of the trials and made an error on 53.5% [SE mean 2.6] of
the trials (t(19) = 1.36, p = .256).
Electrophysiology
Free-choice test-phase
Go- vs. NoGo-trials: Trials with artifacts in the EEG were removed before further analyses
(6.2% of the Go-trials; 7.6% of the NoGo trials). To obtain a measure of prime-related
response activation the LRP for the Go- and NoGo-trials was calculated depending on
the response side the prime had been associated with during the acquisition-phase (prime-
related calculation; see Figure 3.8, page 52). The LRP waveforms for the two trial types
are presented in Figure 3.11 A. The LRP waveforms were divided into consecutive 50 ms
time windows in the interval between prime-onset (0 ms) and 600 ms after prime-onset to
statistically evaluate the time course of response activation. For each of the twelve time
windows the mean amplitude was calculated. Figure 3.11 B presents the mean amplitude
values for each time window.
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors time window (1-12), and trial type
(Go, NoGo) on the mean amplitude values revealed no significant main effects or interac-
tion. To investigate if and when the waveforms of the Go- and NoGo-trials differed from
the baseline (zero) two-tailed paired t-test were conducted on each of the mean amplitude
values of each time window. The only significant effect for the Go-trials was obtained
200-250 ms after prime-onset where the average waveform was significantly more negative
than zero (t(19) = 2.56, p < .02) indicating acquisition-consistent motor activity within
this time window. The NoGo-trials did not differ significantly from zero within any of the
time windows, although they approached significance 200-250 ms after prime-onset (t(19)
= 1.87, p < .08). This result was due to the insignificant difference for the electrode
pair C3/C4; the LRP waveform computed only for the electrode pair FC3/FC4 did differ
significantly from the baseline (p < .04).
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Figure 3.11: (A) Prime-related LRP waveform for the Go-trials (black) and NoGo-trials
(gray) and (B) mean amplitude values of the separate time windows for the Go-trials (white)
and NoGo-trials (gray) of the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 2. Negative values indicate
acquisition(prime)-consistent response activation and positive values acquisition(prime)-inconsistent prime-
induced response activation. Error bars show 95% within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson,
1994).
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Acquisition-consistent vs. acquisition-inconsistent Go-trials: For a follow-up analysis the
Go-trials were split into trials on which acquisition-consistent or acquisition-inconsistent
responses were chosen. The LRP was calculated response-related separately for the
acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent trials (see Figure 3.9, page 53 and EEG data anal-
ysis section for details). The resulting LRP waveforms are presented in Figure 3.12 A.
Again the waveforms were divided into twelve successive 50 ms time windows starting from
prime-onset until 600 ms post-prime The mean amplitude for each time window was cal-
culated (Figure 3.12 B). An ANOVA with the factors time window (1-12) and consistency
(acquisition-consistent choice, acquisition-inconsistent choice) was conducted. The main
effect for time window reached significance due to overall increasing response activation
of the finally executed response (F (11,209) = 29.76, MSe = 1.34, p < .001). The main
effect of consistency also reached significance (F (1,19) = 4.68, MSe = 1.89, p < .05).
There was a reliable difference between the acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent mean
amplitude values 200-350 ms post-prime (ts(19) > 2.0, ps < .05). Within these time win-
dows the LRP from the acquisition-consistent trials was significantly more negative than
zero (ts(19) > 2.8, ps < .02) due to early acquisition-consistent response activation. The
acquisition-consistent LRP continued to stay reliably more negative than zero for the re-
maining time windows due to the activation of the finally executed acquisition-consistent
response (ts(19) > 2.3, ps < .04). By contrast, the LRP from the acquisition-inconsistent
trials was only marginally more positive than the baseline 200-250 ms post-prime indi-
cating borderline initial acquisition(prime)-consistent response activation (note that for
the acquisition-inconsistent trials positive response activation indicates activation of the
response opposite to the one which was chosen and therefore acquisition-consistent re-
sponse activation). From approximately 300 ms onwards the LRP of the acquisition-
inconsistent trials was more negative than baseline. At this time the activation of the
final, acquisition-inconsistent, response started (ts(19) > 3.6, ps < .003). The interaction
of time window-by-consistency failed significance (F (11,209) = 1.43, MSe = .239, p > .10).
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Figure 3.12: (A) Response-related LRP for the acquisition-consistent (black), and
acquisition-inconsistent (gray) trials and (B) the mean amplitudes of the different time
windows for acquisition-consistent (white) and acquisition-inconsistent (gray) trials of the
free-choice test-phase of Experiment 2. Note that negative LRP deflections (amplitude values) in-
dicate response-consistent and positive LRP deflections (amplitude values) response-inconsistent motor
activation. Error bars show 95% within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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Forced-choice priming task
Compatible vs. incompatible vs. neutral trials: Trials with artifacts were removed before
further analysis (< 10% of all trials). Figure 3.13 A shows the response-related LRP
waveforms obtained for the compatible, neutral, and incompatible priming condition (see
2.5, page 29 for details). Strong effects of prime-target compatibility are visible. The
waveforms were divided into twelve time windows of 50 ms. The mean amplitudes within
these time windows were calculated and are presented in Figure 3.13 B.
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors time window (1-12), and compatibil-
ity (compatible, neutral, incompatible) yielded a significant main effect of time window
(F (11,209) = 33.60, MSe = 1.45, p <.001) which was mainly due to more negative activity
in later time windows because of the final activation of the correct response. The main
effect of trial type failed significance (F (2,38) = 2.55, MSe = 1.94, p < .09). The time
window-by-trial type interaction was highly significant (F (22,418) = 3.35, MSe = .242, p
<.00). Planned comparisons showed that the waveforms of the compatible and incompat-
ible conditions began to differ significantly from each other 200-250 ms after prime-onset
(t(19) = 2.88, p <.01). In this time window the compatible waveform approached to be
significantly more negative than zero (t(19) = 1.92, p < .07) indicating prime-consistent
correct response activation. The incompatible waveform, however, was significantly more
positive than zero suggesting an early activation of the incorrect response induced by
the (incompatible) prime (t(19) = 2.21, p < .04). The compatible and incompatible
waveforms continued to be significantly different from each other until 450 ms post-prime
(ts(19) > 2.0, ps < .05). During the remaining time windows the compatible waveform
was continuously significantly more negative than zero (ts(19) > 2.2, ps < .04) indicating
target-related correct response activation. The incompatible waveform stayed significantly
more positive than zero until approximately 300 ms after prime-onset (t(19) = 2.52, p <
.02). Thereafter, it crossed the baseline and became significantly more negative than zero
around 350 ms indicating target-related correct response activation (ts(19) > 2.7, ps <
.02). The waveform of the neutral condition started to become more negative than zero
around 250-300 ms after prime-onset and remained more negative throughout the remain-
ing time windows (ts(19) > 2.6, ps < .02) due to correct response activation. The neutral
and compatible waveforms never differed significantly from each other. The neutral wave-
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form was significantly more negative than the incompatible waveform starting at around
250-350 ms post-prime (ts(19) > 2.6, ps < .02). This was also due to earlier target-related
activation of the correct response on neutral trials as compared to incompatible trials.
Overall prime activity: To obtain a measure of overall prime-related response activation
the compatible and incompatible trials were pooled and the prime-related LRP (see Figure
3.8, page 52) was calculated. The resulting LRP waveform is comparable to the waveforms
of the Go- and NoGo-trials of the free-choice test-phase which were also calculated prime-
related. It illustrates the amount to which the primes activated their mapped response,
irrespective of the executed response. Neutral trials were not included in this analysis
because the neutral prime was not mapped to any response and could therefore not induce
any response processes. Figure 3.14 A shows the resulting LRP waveforms. The waveform
was split into 50 ms time windows from 0-600 ms post-prime and the mean amplitude
values were calculated (Figure 3.14 B). An ANOVA with the factor time window (1-12)
yielded a significant main effect (F (11,209) = 4.50, MSe = .167, p < .001). This effect
was due to reliable response activation by the primes starting around 200 ms after prime-
onset and lasting for about 250 ms (ts(19) > 2.2, ps < .04). After 450 ms the waveform
returned to the baseline because after a prime (e.g., the square) the target could either
be response-compatible (e.g., also a square) or response-incompatible (e.g., the diamond).
This setting lead to a cancellation of target-related response activity.
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Figure 3.13: (A) Response-related LRP waveforms for compatible (black), neutral (light
gray), and incompatible (dark gray), trials and (B) mean amplitudes of the LRP in different
time windows for compatible (white), neutral (light gray), and incompatible (dark gray)
trials in the forced-choice priming task of Experiment 2. Note that negative LRP deflections
(values) indicate correct and positive LRP deflections (values) incorrect response activation (relative to
the target stimulus). Error bars show 95% within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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Figure 3.14: (A) Prime-related LRP waveform for averaged compatible and incompatible
trials and (B) mean amplitudes for different time windows of the forced-choice priming task of
Experiment 2. Note that negative LRP deflections (mean amplitude values) indicate prime-consistent
and positive LRP deflections (mean amplitude values) prime-inconsistent motor activation. Error bars
show 95% within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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3.2.4 Discussion
In contrast to Experiment 1, the behavioral results of Experiment 2 did not suggest an
influence of the unconscious effect-primes on the response-choice. No response bias in the
sense of more acquisition-phase consistent than -inconsistent key-choices was obtained in
the free-choice test-phase. One likely explanation for the missing bias is the nature of the
Go/NoGo-paradigm. In the test-phase of Experiment 1, participants could press any of
the two possible response keys as soon as the Go-signal appeared without further elaborate
processing of the imperative stimulus. Thus, responses were executed very fast as manifest
in mean RTs around 200 ms. In contrast, in the Go/NoGo- test-phase of Experiment 2
the imperative stimulus had to be processed in more detail in order to decide whether a
response had to be executed or withheld. This additional processing time became evident
in longer RTs to the Go-signal. This additional top-down (intentional) process might have
weakened the influence of automatic, bottom-up processes (i.e., prime-related response
activation), especially if the partial response activation induced by the effect-primes was
not very strong.
Importantly, the LRP data clearly revealed that the effect-primes did indeed ac-
tivated their associated motor codes. This became evident in reliable prime-induced
acquisition-consistent response activation starting at around 200 ms after prime-onset
in the Go-trials of the free-choice test-phase. Additionally, different time courses of re-
sponse activation could be observed for acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent trials. In
the acquisition-phase consistent trials substantial prime-induced acquisition-consistent re-
sponse activation started at about 200 ms after prime-onset and continuously increased
until the acquisition-consistent response was executed. In the acquisition-inconsistent
trials, on the other hand, an initial (about 200 ms after prime-onset) activation of the
response opposite to the one finally executed was visible (i.e., an acquisition-consistent
response activation). This activation was reversed after about 50 ms into activation of the
actually executed (acquisition-inconsistent) response. This means that there was an early
prime-induced activation of the acquisition-consistent response on both the acquisition-
consistent as well as the acquisition-inconsistent trials, which was however smaller in
amplitude (i.e., weaker) for the acquisition-inconsistent trials. What could lead to the re-
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versal of response activation in the acquisition-inconsistent trials? One possibility is that
the perception and processing of the prime stimulus was not equally strong on all trials.
The mean amplitude of the LRP in the crucial time window of the LRP was, as mentioned
above, on a descriptive level smaller on acquisition-inconsistent than on consistent trials.
One possibility could therefore be that on trials where the priming effect was weak (and
partial response activation was small) the probability of choosing the non-associated (i.e.,
inconsistent) response was higher relative to trials with strong prime-induced response
activation. Conversely, on trials on which prime-induced response activation was stronger
there was presumably also a stronger bias to choose the acquisition-consistent response.
Further, the RT data obtained from the free-choice test-phase revealed shorter RTs for
acquisition-consistent trials. Consistent with the interpretation outlined above, this find-
ing suggests that on trials where prime-induced motor activation was strong this activation
led to a faster (immediate) execution of the primed response (at least on a large proportion
of trials). By contrast, on trials with less prime-induced motor activity the smaller bias
to choose the acquisition-consistent response presumably also delayed the final choice and
thus resulted in longer RTs. There was also a borderline reliable effect of prime-related
acquisition-consistent response activation on the NoGo-trials. The smaller amplitude of
the effect for NoGo- as compared to Go-trials could be due to overall weaker response ac-
tivation on NoGo-trials (presumably due to fast inhibition of response activation processes
after the appearance of the NoGo-signal).
Taken together, the results of the test-phase of Experiment 2 indicate that the uncon-
scious presentation of former action-effects automatically activates associated motor codes.
The chance level performance in the prime discrimination task again show that the primes
were indeed not consciously perceived. Further, the results of the forced-choice priming
task suggest that the prime-stimuli could generally influence behavior in the expected di-
rection (shorter RTs on compatible as compared to incompatible and neutral trials) and
that they reliably induce motor activity (as evident in initial prime-induced response ac-
tivation in the LRP). Interesting in this context is, that the size of the prime-induced
response activation by the effect-primes in the test-phase was equal to that induced by the
primes in the forced-choice priming task. This shows that both response association types
(the R-E association in the acquisition-phase which was responsible for the priming effect
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in the test-phase and the S-R mapping from the forced-choice priming task) had equally
strong effects on response selection processes. One interesting question concerns the time
course of the response priming effect. It has been shown in forced-choice priming experi-
ments, that partial response activation by masked primes may subsequently reverse into
inhibition of the primed response (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002;
see 2.3.2, page 20 for details on the activation-followed-by-inhibition hypothesis). Such
an inhibitory mechanism may also be functionally relevant in the context of automatic
response activation by unconscious effect features. Such an automatic response activation
might be helpful in situations where the activated response is the one, which most likely
has to be carried out. However, it is also necessary to inhibit such automatic response
tendencies, especially when a sudden change in the environment requires an instant mod-
ification of one’s response tendencies or if response tendencies have been activated that
are inappropriate in a given context. To investigate how response activation induced by
unconscious effect features develops over time, Experiment 3 was conducted.
3.3 Experiment 3: The time course of unconscious response
priming by action-effects
3.3.1 Introduction
Although the LRP results of Experiment 2 clearly indicate that unconsciously presented
action-effects can activate associated motor codes the results also raise some questions
which remain to be answered. In particular, a further experiment using the LRP as an
indicator of response activation was conducted in order to investigate the time course of
response-priming induced by action-effects. Specifically, the question was whether masked
effect-primes may under certain conditions also lead to inhibition of associated motor
responses, similar to the negative compatibility effect (NCE) that has been observed in
forced-choice tasks (see 2.3.2, page 20 for details on the NCE). Eimer and Schlaghecken
(1998; see 2.3 for details) have shown that unconscious primes activate responses which
have been mapped to them in the instruction. However, if the time between prime-onset
and target-onset is sufficiently long the initial response activation appears to be automat-
ically inhibited. This activation-followed-by-inhibition process resulted in shorter RTs on
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incompatible trials (i.e., if prime and target were mapped to different responses) relative
to compatible trials and was importantly also visible in the LRP, suggesting that it was
indeed motor activation and inhibition which lead to the behavioral results. Interest-
ingly, inhibition was induced only if the primes were presented subliminally. Consciously
perceivable primes did not produce the pattern of results (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002).
Since the effect-primes in the present experiments were also presented unconsciously it is
fair to assume that the initial response activation induced by the effect-primes is inhibited
if the time between prime-onset and Go-signal-onset is increased. To test this hypothesis,
Experiment 3 was conducted.
In Experiment 3 a similar design as in Experiment 1 and 2 was used. Importantly,
the time between the onset of the prime and the appearance of the Go-signal in the free-
choice test-phase was increased. If, as expected, the effect-primes activate the responses
associated with them, this activation should again be evident around 200 ms after prime-
onset. However, due to the longer time interval until the key-choice the initial response
activation should return to a baseline level or even reverse into inhibition of the response
associated with the effect-prime (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). As a consequence, with a
longer prime - Go-signal SOA no or even a reversed response bias should be visible in the
free-choice key-presses in the test-phase. The stimuli used in Experiment 3 differed from
that of the former two experiments because the mask used in Experiment 1 and 2 might
have influenced the results in the free-choice test-phase in a unintended way. As the mask
in these experiments consisted of a superimposition of the two effect-stimuli it included
features, which had been associated with different responses in the acquisition-phase. This
could be problematic if the prime - Go-signal SOA is increased. If the effect-primes activate
the response associated with them, the mask, which follows the prime in close temporal
succession, could partially activated the response associated with the other stimulus (e.g.,
if a square is presented as effect-prime and partially activates its associated response [e.g.,
left], the mask could lead to an activation of response associated with the diamond [e.g.,
right]; Llerras & Enns, 2004; see 2.3.2, page 20 for details on the object-substitution
hypothesis and the NCE). In order to exclude this alternative explanation, a new mask
was used to reduce the possibility of unwanted response activation by the mask. In the
forced-choice priming task, where the prime - target SOA was also increased, RTs should
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be shortest on incompatible as compared to compatible and neutral trials due to response
inhibition processes (see 2.3.2, page 20 for a description of the NCE). Correspondingly,
reliable inhibition of the primed responses should be visible in the LRP from the compatible
and incompatible conditions. Experiment 3, like the first two experiments, consisted of
four experimental parts which were conducted in succession (acquisition-phase, free-choice
test-phase (questionnaire), prime discrimination phase and forced-choice priming task).
The EEG was recorded during the test-phase and the forced-choice priming task.
3.3.2 Method
Participants
Twenty-six näıve volunteers (students from the Dresden University of Technology; age
18-28, mean age 22.6; 15 female; all right-handed) participated in Experiment 3. All of
them had normal or corrected to normal vision and reported no history of neurological or
psychiatric disorders. They either received course credit or were paid Euro 5 per hour for
their participation.
Stimuli, procedure, and design
Acquisition-phase
The stimuli used in the acquisition-phase of Experiment 3 are shown in Figure 3.15. They
extended 4 cm in width and height (1.750 visual angle). The procedure and design of the
acquisition-phase was identical to the acquisition-phases of Experiments 1 and 2.
Free-choice test-phase
The stimuli and timing of the test-phase of Experiment 3 are shown in Figure 3.16. The
prime stimuli extended 2 cm in width and height (1.200 visual angle). The mask stimulus
extended 4 cm in width and height (1.750 visual angle). The cross used as a Go-signal
extended 3 cm and the # sign ( NoGo-signal) 3.2 cm. The procedure and design of the
free-choice test-phase was almost identical to that of Experiment 2. The only differences
were the duration of the mask, which was now presented for 100 ms and the number of
trials (336 Go- and 336 NoGo-trials). The test-phase consisted of 12 blocks with 56 trials
each. 10 practice trials were administered prior to the beginning of the main task.
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Action-Effect 500 ms
Free Choice Response
 
Go-Signal
Blank 50 ms
+
Figure 3.15: Sequence of events on a trial of the acquisition-phase of Experiment 3.
Questionnaire
After the free-choice test-phase participants filled out a short questionnaire to investigate
whether they were subjectively able to identify the prime-stimuli (see appendix C).
Forced-choice priming task
The primes used in the forced-choice priming task were the same as in the free-choice
test-phase (see Figure 3.16, 70). Additionally, a third (neutral) prime was introduced.
This neutral prime was a superimposition of the two effect-prime stimuli and extended
1.200 of visual angle. The effect stimuli from the acquisition-phase served as targets in the
forced choice priming task. The only differences in the procedure and design as compared
to Experiment 2 were that the mask was presented for 100 ms and that there were 480
trials overall (160 compatible, 160 neutral, 160 incompatible). The task was divided into
8 experimental blocks (60 trials each, 20 practice trials).
Prime discrimination task
The primes and the Go-signal were the same as in the free-choice test-phase (see Figure
3.16). The timing of the prime discrimination task was also identical to the test-phase.
The only difference in the procedure was that participants were asked to indicate which
stimulus (diamond or square) appeared prior to the mask. The task consisted of 200 trials
(each prime was presented 100 times) and was divided into 4 experimental blocks (50 trials
each). Before the first experimental blocks a practice block of 10 trials was given.
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# +
Go-Signal
Mask 100 ms
Blank 32 ms
Effect Prime 32 ms
_____
_____
_____
_______ ________ Free-Choice Response
 
Blank 50 ms
Action-Effect 300 ms
NoGo-Signal
or
Figure 3.16: Sequence of events on a trial of the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 3.
EEG data acquisition and analysis
The EEG was recorded during the test-phase and the forced choice priming task. The
recording setting differed from that in Experiment 2 only in the number and location of
recording sites. Fifteen Ag/AgCl electrodes were used to derive the EEG (F3, Fz, F4, FC3,
FC1, FC2, FC4, C3, C1, Cz, C2, C4, P7, Pz, P8; see Figure 3.7, page 49 for the location of
the electrode sites on the scalp). The sampling rate was 1000 Hz. The amplifier had a high
cut-off of 250 Hz and a time-constant of 10 s (low cut-off = 0.016 Hz). The software-filters
were set to high cut-off of 80 Hz. A notch-filter (50 Hz) was applied. All impedances were
kept below 5 kΩ throughout the experiment. EEG analysis, i.e., segmentation, baseline
correction, artifact rejection, and LRP calculation methods were equivalent to those of
Experiment 2 (see 3.2.2, page 48).
The Experiment started with the acquisition-phase followed by the test-phase, the
forced-choice priming task, and the prime discrimination task. It took about 2.5 hours to
complete the entire experiment.
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3.3.3 Results
Behavioral performance
Three subjects had to be excluded due to a large number of artifacts in the data (>30% of
the trials). The following analyses (for the behavioral and electrophysiological data) were
performed on data from the remaining 23 subjects.
Acquisition-phase
The two frequencies with which the two effect stimuli were produced were almost identical
and did not differ significantly (50.9% [SE mean 1.6] and 49.1% [SE mean 1.6]; t(22) =
.586, p > .70).
Free-choice test-phase
For the Go-trials, the mean key-choice frequency and the mean RT was calculated for
acquisition-phase consistent and acquisition-phase inconsistent key-choices. The acqui-
sition-consistent key was chosen on 50.1% [SE mean 0.7] and the acquisition-inconsistent
key on 49.9% [SE mean 0.7] of all Go-trials. These frequencies did not differ significantly
from chance (t(22) = .135, p > .88). There was thus no prime-induced response bias.
RT outliers (criterion described in the result of the forced-choice priming task of
Experiment 1; 1.3% of all trials) were removed before further RT analyses. Mean RTs
for acquisition-consistent (492 ms [SE mean 23]) and acquisition-inconsistent (502 ms [SE
mean 23]) trials did not differ significantly (t(22) = 1.02, p > .30). The false alarm rate
on NoGo-trials was 2.9%.
Questionnaire
Again, none of the subjects correctly identified the purpose of the task nor did any subject
correctly report the shape of the primes.
Forced-choice priming task
The mean correct RTs for the compatible, neutral, and incompatible trials are presented
in Figure 3.17. RT outliers (RTs below 200 ms and above 2000 ms and RTs on which
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Figure 3.17: Mean correct response times (RTs) for compatible (white), neutral (light gray),
and incompatible (dark gray) trials of the forced-choice priming task of Experiment 3. Error
bars show 95 % within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
the score deviated from the mean score for that experimental condition with an absolute
value for z > 2.5, 1.8% of all trials) and trials on which a response error was made (1.4%
of all trials) were excluded before further analysis. A repeated measures ANOVA with the
factor compatibility (compatible, neutral, incompatible) performed on the remaining RTs
revealed a significant main effect (F (2,44) = 24.72, MSe = 246.39, p < .001).
This effect was due to significantly shorter RTs on compatible as compared to neutral
and incompatible trials (ts(22) > 5.72, ps < .001, RTs were 485 ms [SE mean 27], 465 ms
[SE mean 27], and 452 ms [31] for the compatible, neutral, and incompatible condition,
respectively). The corresponding ANOVA on the error rates also yielded a significant
main effect of compatibility (F (2,44) = 26.48, MSe = .423, p < .001). Participants made
significantly more errors on compatible (2.1% [SE mean .29]) as compared to neutral (1.4%
[SE mean .90]) and incompatible trials (.74% [SE mean .16]; ts(22) > 4.36, ps < .001).
Prime discrimination task
The hit rate (i.e., proportion of correctly identified primes) in the prime discrimination
task was 51.4% [SE mean 1.3] did not differ significantly different from chance (t(22) =
1.084, p > .20) indicating that the primes were not consciously identified.
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Electrophysiology
Free-choice test-phase
Go- vs. NoGo-trials: A first analysis was conducted on the Go- and NoGo-trials separately.
This was again done to examine the overall influence of the primes (i.e., whether they
induced response activation). Go-trials with artifacts and with RTs exceeding 1200 ms
(measure from the onset of the Go-signal) were excluded before further analyses (2.4%).
NoGo-trials with artifacts and mistaken response execution were removed (5.8%). The
prime-related LRP (see Figure 3.8, page 52) was calculated for both the Go- and NoGo-
trials. Figure 3.18 A presents the resulting LRP waveforms.
As in Experiment 2, the waveforms were divided into twelve successive time windows
of 50 ms starting from 0 to 600 ms post-prime for statistical analysis. The mean ampli-
tude values in the different time windows were calculated (Figure 3.18 B). An ANOVA
with the factors time window (1-12) and trial type (Go, NoGo) revealed a significant main
effect of time window (F (11,242) = 1.88, MSe = .066, p < .05). The main effect of trial
type failed to reach significance (p > 1), as did the interaction (F (11,242) = 1.50, MSe =
.061, p > .2). Separate two-tailed paired t-tests showed that the Go- and NoGo-trials did
not differ significantly from each other in any of the twelve time windows. Importantly,
150-200 ms post-prime the Go-trials were significantly more negative than zero indicat-
ing prime-induced acquisition-consistent response activation (t(22) = 2.4, p < .03). The
NoGo-trials never differed significantly from the baseline.
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Figure 3.18: (A) Prime-related LRP for the Go-trials (black) and NoGo-trials (gray) and
(B) mean amplitudes in the different time windows for the Go-trials (white) and NoGo-
trials (gray) of the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 3. Note that negative LRP deflections
(values) indicate acquisition-consistent and positive LRP deflections (values) acquisition-inconsistent re-
sponse activation. Error bars show 95 % within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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Acquisition-consistent vs. acquisition-inconsistent trials: In a next step the response-related
LRP waveforms were computed separately for acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent Go-
trials (see Figure 3.9, page 53 and the EEG data analysis section of Experiment 2 for de-
tails). Figure 3.19 A shows the LRP waveforms obtained for the acquisition-consistent and
acquisition-inconsistent conditions. The waveforms were divided into twelve successive 50
ms time windows (0-600 ms post-prime) and the mean amplitude within these different
time windows was calculated (3.19 B). An repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors
time window (1-12), and consistency (consistent, inconsistent) revealed a significant main
effect of time window (F (11,242) = 43.56, MSe = .506, p < .001) as well as a significant
interaction (F (11,242) = 2.29, MSe = .114, p < .02). The main effect of consistency failed
significance (F (1,22) = .495, MSe = 1.07, p > .40). Two-tailed paired t-tests showed that
the LRPs from the acquisition-consistent and - inconsistent trials differed significantly
from each other 150-200 ms after prime-onset (t(22) = 2.5, p < .02). Within this time
window the acquisition-consistent LRP was significantly more negative than zero indicat-
ing early prime-induced acquisition-consistent response activation (t(22) = 2.5, p < .03).
From 200-300 ms post-prime the acquisition-consistent LRP was not different from base-
line. At about 300 ms the activation of the finally executed acquisition-consistent response
started (ts(22) > 2.1, ps < .04). The acquisition-inconsistent LRP was significantly more
negative than the baseline 100-150 ms post-prime (t(22) = 2.48, p < .03) and from 350 ms
onwards indicating the activation of the finally executed acquisition-inconsistent response
(ts(22) > 2.4, ps < .03).
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Figure 3.19: (A) Response-related LRP waveforms for acquisition-consistent (black) and
acquisition-inconsistent (gray) key-choices and (B) mean amplitude in different time windows
for acquisition-consistent (white) and -inconsistent (gray) trials within the Go-trials of the
free-choice test-phase of Experiment 3. Note that negative deflections (values) indicate response-
consistent response activation and positive deflections (values) response-inconsistent response activation.
Error bars show 95 % within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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Forced-choice priming task
Compatible vs. neutral vs. incompatible trials: Trials with artifacts were excluded before
further analyses (< 10% of all trials). The response-related LRP waveforms for the com-
patible, incompatible, and neutral condition of the forced-choice priming task are shown
in Figure 3.20 A (see 2.5, page 29 for LRP calculation). The waveforms were divided
into twelve successive 50 ms time windows and the mean amplitude of the different time
windows was calculated separately for each condition (Figure 3.20 B).
An ANOVA on the mean amplitude values from the time windows with the fac-
tors time window (1-12), and compatibility (compatible, neutral, incompatible) revealed
a significant main effect of time window (F (11,242) = 46.29, MSe = .744, p < .001).
The main effect of compatibility failed significance (F (2,44) = 2.217, MSe = 1.296, p >
.10) Clear differences between the LRP waveforms were visible and became evident in a
significant interaction (F (22,484) = 4.262, MSe = .235, p < .001). Planned comparisons
showed that the LRP waveforms from the compatible and incompatible trials first differed
significantly from each other 150-300 ms post-prime (ts(22) > 2.10, ps < .04). 250-300
ms post-prime the compatible LRP waveform was significantly more negative than zero
(t(22) = 2.37, p < .03) indicating prime-induced correct response activation whereas the
incompatible waveform approached to be significantly more positive than zero from 150-
300 ms post-prime (i.e., in the direction of incorrect response activation; ts(22) > 1.97, ps
< .07). Around 400 ms post-prime the incompatible LRP started to become more nega-
tive than the baseline due to final correct response activation after the appearance of the
target (ts(22) > 4.64, ps < .001). The compatible waveform returned to the baseline 300-
450 ms post-prime and again started to be more negative from 450 ms onwards indicating
target-induced correct response activation (ts(22) > 4.68, ps < .001). The compatible and
neutral LRP waveforms only differed significantly from each other from 400-450 ms (t(22)
= 3.48, ps < .002). During this time window the neutral waveform was more negative
than the baseline because final target-related response activation had already started on
neutral trials (t(22) = 1.90, p < .06) as compared to compatible trials. The neutral and
incompatible LRP differed significantly from 150-350 ms (ts(22) > 2.27, ps < .03). During
this time the incompatible LRP was more positive due to initial incorrect prime-induced
response activation whereas no prime-induced response activity was evident for neutral
trials (ps > .10).
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Overall prime activity: The obtain a measure of overall response activation elicited by the
primes the prime-related LRP (see Figure 3.8, page 52 for details) was calculated, aver-
aging across compatible and incompatible trials (neutral trials were not included because
they were not mapped to any response and should therefore not induce any response ac-
tivity). The resulting waveform is presented in Figure 3.21 A. The waveform was divided
into twelve 50 ms time windows and the mean amplitude for each time window was cal-
culated (Figure 3.21 B). An ANOVA on the mean amplitude values with the factor time
window (1-12) yielded a significant main effect (F (11,242) = 7.47, MSe = .140, p < .001).
Planned comparisons (two-sided t-tests) revealed significant prime-consistent response ac-
tivation in the time windows 150-300 ms after prime-onset (ts(22) > 2.0, ps < .05). In
later time windows (350-450 ms) the effect reversed (ts(22) > 2.6, ps < .02) resulting in
reliable prime-inconsistent response activation. This result shows that the primes first ac-
tivated the response mapped to them. However, after some time this response activation
reversed (do to inhibition of the activated response) and response activation opposite to
that associated with the prime (prime-inconsistent) is evident.
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Figure 3.20: (A) Response-related LRP waveform for compatible (black), neutral (light
gray), and incompatible (dark gray) trials and (B) mean amplitudes for the different time
windows for compatible (white), neutral (light gray), and incompatible (dark gray) trials
from the forced-choice priming task of Experiment 3. Negative LRP deflections (amplitude values)
indicate correct (response-consistent) response activation and positive LRP deflections (amplitude values)
incorrect (response-inconsistent) response activation. Error bars show 95 % within-subjects confidence
intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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Figure 3.21: (A) Prime-related LRP waveform for averaged compatible and incompatible
trials and (B) mean amplitudes for different time windows of the forced-choice priming
task of Experiment 3. Negative LRP deflections (amplitude values) indicate prime-consistent response
activation and positive LRP deflections (amplitude values) prime-inconsistent response activation. Error
bars show 95 % within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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3.3.4 Discussion
Experiment 3 aimed to investigate the time course of the response activation induced by
masked action-effect primes found in Experiment 2. To this end, the time between the
offset of the effect-prime and the onset of the Go-signal was increased to 100 ms. The
results obtained for the Go-trials of the free-choice test-phase indicated that prime-related
response activation started at about 150 ms after prime-onset. As in Experiment 2, this
early (prime-induced) response activation was reliable only for acquisition-consistent key-
choice trials. Thus, replicating the results of Experiment 2, the subliminally presented
effect-primes re-activated their associated responses at least to a certain degree. This
activation was stronger on trials on which the acquisition-consistent response was in fact
executed. It is possible that the strength of the prime-induced response activation varied
between individual trials and that, as suggested in the discussion of Experiment 2, on trials
on which the prime-induced response activation was strong the likelihood increased that
the already primed (acquisition-consistent) response was chosen (relative to trials on which
prime-related response activation was weaker). Why should response priming differ in its
magnitude on different trials? One explanation is that participants already decided before
the effect-prime appeared which key they wanted to press in the case of a Go-signal. This
premature decision might already have led to a partial activation of the ”chosen” response.
If now a prime appeared which had been associated with this ”chosen” response the already
existing partial response activation increased and an execution of this response after the
Go-signal became more likely. In contrast to Experiment 2, the early prime-induced motor
activity vanished after approximately 100 ms and stayed at baseline until final response-
related motor activation started after the onset of the Go-signal (approximately 300 ms
post-prime for acquisition-consistent and 350 ms post-prime for acquisition-inconsistent
trials). One plausible explanation of why the early prime-induced motor activity returned
to baseline is that the longer duration of the mask led to an automatic inhibition of
the initially activated response (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002).
This would also additionally explain why, in contrast to Experiment 1, no prime-induced
response bias was obtained in Experiment 3 and acquisition-consistent and acquisition-
inconsistent key-choices were made equally often.
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One open question is why no reliable prime-related response activation was obtained
on the NoGo-trials. One explanation for this finding is that the effect-primes were not
strong enough to induce reliable response activation on these trials. Although it has been
shown in numerous ERP experiments that supraliminally presented stimuli which were
explicitly mapped to specific responses in the instruction can trigger a partial activation
of these responses even if no response execution is required after their presentation (e.g.,
Miller & Hackley, 1992), few studies have been conducted to investigate the influence of
subliminally presented prime stimuli under conditions in which no overt response has to be
executed. To further explore this issue, in Experiment 4 prime-related response activation
on NoGo-trials was investigated in a forced-choice reaction task.
3.4 Experiment 4: Go/NoGo-priming control experiment
3.4.1 Introduction
In Experiment 2 and 3 a Go/NoGo paradigm was used in the free-choice test-phase. The
analysis of the the LRP obtained from the Go-trials revealed reliable acquisition-consistent
prime-related motor activation starting at about 200 ms after prime-onset. This result
could not be replicated for the NoGo-trials, although one could have expected this result
(Miller & Hackley, 1992).
In Experiment 2 and 3 the primes were effect-stimuli that had been associated with
specific motor responses in a prior learning phase. Experiment 4 was conducted to investi-
gate the time course of response activation in a combined forced-choice reaction and NoGo
task. The main question was whether subliminally presented primes do activate associ-
ated responses on NoGo-trials when the primes are not action-effects, but stimuli which
are mapped to particular actions by an explicit stimulus-response mapping specified in the
instruction. Experiment 4 consisted of a forced-choice priming task with again response-
compatible and -incompatible trials and an equal number of NoGo-trials. Thereafter a
prime discrimination task was applied.
It was predicted that RTs on Go-trials should be longer in this combined Go/NoGo-
task relative to the Go-trials in the pure forced-choice priming tasks of the previous three
experiments (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2001). Using a mixed forced-choice Go/NoGo design,
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Eimer and Schlaghecken (2001) found that RTs in the Go-trials increased as a function of
the number of NoGo-trials but that priming effects were unaffected by their number. One
further prediction for Experiment 4 is reliable prime-induced motor activity in the LRP
as early as 200 ms post-prime on Go- as well as on NoGo-trials.
3.4.2 Method
Participants
Seventeen students from the Dresden University of Technology (age 18-30, mean age 23.2;
13 female) participated in Experiment 4. All of them had normal or corrected to normal
vision and reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. They either received
course credit or were paid Euro 5 per hour for their participation.
Stimuli, procedure, and design
Forced-choice priming task
The prime and target stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 3 but a differ-
ent mask was used which consisted of randomly arranged small dots (i.e., random-noise
mask). The mask extended 1.810 visual angle. Each trial started with the presentation of
a prime stimulus (square or diamond) for 16 ms. Following a blank interval of 32 ms the
mask appeared for 16 ms. Immediately after the offset of the mask the target (square or
diamond) appeared on 2/3 of all trials for 300 ms. Half of the participants were asked to
press the left response key whenever a square appeared and the right response key if a dia-
mond was the target (vice versa for the other half of the participants). On 1/3 of the trials
the NoGo-signal (#) appeared, which indicated that no response had to be made (NoGo-
trials). There were 648 trials overall (216 compatible, 216 incompatible, 216 NoGo). The
task was divided into 12 experimental blocks (54 trials each). Before the main experiment
participants were administered a practice block of 20 trials. The independent variable was
trial type (compatible, incompatible, NoGo) and the dependent variables were RT [ms],
error rate [%], and the LRP [µV].
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Prime discrimination task
The stimuli (i.e., the primes, the mask, and the Go-signal) were identical to the ones used
in the forced-choice priming task. During the prime discrimination task a prime (one of
the two primes from the forced-choice priming task) was presented for 16 ms. Immediately
after the offset of the prime a blank screen appeared for 32 ms and was followed by the
mask which stayed on the screen for 16 ms. After the mask a Go-signal appeared and
participants were asked to indicate (or guess) which prime they had seen prior the the
mask (diamond or square). There were 100 trials overall (each prime was presented 50
times). The task was divided into 2 experimental blocks (50 trials each). Before the first
experimental block participants were administered a practice block of 10 trials.
EEG data acquisition
The EEG was recorded during the force-choice priming task. Twenty-three electrodes
were used (F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FC1, FC2, FC4, T7, T8, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1, O2, F7, F8;
for the reference and EOG see Experiment 2). The data was sampled at a rate of 1000 Hz
with a low cut-off of 10s (0.0016 Hz) and a high cut-off of 250 Hz. Offline a notch-filter
(50 Hz) and a high cut-off filter of 80 Hz were applied to the data and the sampling rate
was changed to 250 Hz. All impedances were kept below 5 kΩ throughout the experiment.
The segmentation, baseline correction, artifact rejection, and LRP calculation methods
were equivalent to those used in Experiments 2 and 3.
The Experiment started with the forced-choice priming task followed by the prime
discrimination task. It took about 2 hours to complete the entire experiment.
3.4.3 Results
Behavioral performance
Forced-choice priming task
The mean correct RTs for the compatible and incompatible trials are shown in Figure 3.22.
RT outliers (RTs below 200 ms and above 2000 ms and RTs on which the score deviated
from the mean score for that experimental condition with an absolute value for z > 2.5;
1.6% of all trials) and trials on which a response error was made (2.2% of all trials) were
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Figure 3.22: Mean correct response times (RTs) for compatible (white) and incompatible
(gray) trials of the priming task of Experiment 4. Error bars show 95 % within-subjects confidence
intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
excluded before further analysis. The mean RT on compatible trials (496 ms [SE mean
12.8] was significantly faster than on incompatible trials (524 ms [SE mean 11.7] (F (1,16)
= 30.9, MSe = 208.08, p < .001). Correspondingly, the error rate was significantly higher
for incompatible than for compatible trials (1.6% [SE mean .43] and 2.7% [SE mean .53]
for compatible and incompatible trials, respectively; F (1,16) = 6.1, MSe = 1.578,p < .03).
The false alarm rate in the NoGo-trials was 2.9%.
Prime discrimination task
Participants correctly identified the primes on 50.7% [SE mean .9] of all trials, which was
not significantly different from the chance level (t(16) = .491, p > .50).
Electrophysiology
Compatible vs. incompatible vs. NoGo-trials: To investigate prime-induced response acti-
vation for the three conditions I calculated the response-related LRP separately for the
compatible and incompatible trials (see Figure 2.5, page 29) and the prime-related LRP
(see Figure 3.8, page 52) for the NoGo trials (Figure 3.23 A). As in the other experiments,
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the waveforms were divided into 50 ms time windows from prime-onset to 600 ms after
prime-onset. The mean amplitude values of the time windows are shown in Figure 3.23 B.
Separate ANOVAS for the mean amplitude values of the response-related LRP of
the Go-trials (time window [1-12] by compatibility [compatible, incompatible]) and the
prime-related LRP of the NoGo-trials (time window [1-12]) were conducted. The ANOVA
for the Go-trials revealed a significant main effect for time window (F (11,176) = 50.83,
MSe = .585, p < .001). This was due to overall more negative (correct) response activa-
tion on later time windows. The main effect of compatibility failed significance (p > .10).
The differences between the LRP waveforms from the compatible and incompatble trials
were substantiated by a significant time window-by-compatibility interaction (F (11,176)
= 5.00, MSe = .245, p < .001). The compatible and incompatible waveforms were sig-
nificantly different from each other starting 250-350 ms post-prime (ts(16) > 2.5, p <
.03). The compatible LRP waveform indicated reliable prime-induced ”correct” response
activation (significantly more negative than baseline) starting at about 250 ms (ts(16) >
2.8, p < .02). The incompatible LRP waveform did not differ from the baseline until 350
ms post-prime when it started to become significantly more negative than zero indicating
target-related correct response activation (ts(16) > 3.3, ps < .005). The main effect for
time window for the NoGo-trials did not reach significance (p > .30). Although on a
descriptive level, the NoGo LRP was more negative than the baseline in the time windows
starting 250 ms post-prime, it never differed significantly from zero indicating that the
primes did not elicit a reliable response activation on the NoGo-trials. The compatible
and the NoGo waveform differed significantly from each other starting from about 350 ms
post-prime due to final response activation on compatible trials (ts(16) > 3.5, ps < .003).
The incompatible and the NoGo LRP differed reliable starting from 400 ms onwards when
the final response activation on the incompatible trials started (ts(16) > 3.2, ps < .005).
Overall prime activity on the Go-trials: To examine the ”net” magnitude of response ac-
tivation elicited by the primes on the Go-trials the prime-related LRP waveform of the
averaged compatible and incompatible trials was computed (Figure 3.24 A). As in the pre-
vious experiments, these prime-related waveforms do not reflect response activation caused
by the actually executed responses, but rather indicate response activation induced by the
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subliminal primes, irrespective of which response was actually performed (see Figure 3.8,
page 52). The resulting waveform was divided into 50 ms time windows (0-600 ms post-
prime) and the mean amplitudes in these time windows were computed (Figure 3.24 B).
An ANOVA of these mean amplitudes with the factor time window (1-12) revealed a sig-
nificant main effect (F (11,176) = 4.96, MSe = .129, p < .001). Two-sided t-tests revealed
that the LRP was significantly more negative from zero 250-400 ms post-prime indicating
prime-consistent response activation during these time windows (ts(16) > 2.5, p < .03).
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Figure 3.23: (A) Response-related LRPs for the compatible- (black) and incompatible-trials
(dark-gray), and the prime-related LRP for the NoGo-trials (light-gray) of the forced-choice
priming task of Experiment 4 Negative LRP deflections (amplitude values) indicate correct response
activation and positive LRP deflections indicate incorrect response activation for the compatible and in-
compatible waveform and prime-inconsistent response activation for the NoGo waveform. Error bars show
95 % within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994). (B) Mean amplitudes for the dif-
ferent time windows for the compatible- (white), incompatible (dark-gray), and NoGo-trials
(light-gray) of the forced-choice priming task of Experiment 4. Negative LRP deflections (ampli-
tude values) indicate correct response activation and positive LRP deflections indicate incorrect response
activation for the compatible and incompatible waveform and prime-inconsistent response activation for
the NoGo waveform. Error bars show 95 % within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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Figure 3.24: (A) Prime-related LRP waveform for averaged compatible and incompatible
(Go-) trials and (B) mean amplitudes for different time windows of forced-choice priming
task of Experiment 4. Negative LRP deflections (amplitude values) indicate prime-consistent response
activation and positive LRP deflections (amplitude values) prime-inconsistent response activation. Error
bars show 95 % within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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3.4.4 Discussion
Experiment 4 was conducted to investigate partial response activation by subliminal primes
in Go- and NoGo-trials in a forced-choice reaction task. The behavioral results of the Go-
trials revealed a positive compatibility effect (PCE) of 28 ms, which was of the same
magnitude as the PCE effect obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 or the NCE obtained
in Experiment 3. This shows that reducing general response readiness by inserting a
larger number of NoGo-trials did not affect the overall impact of the primes. Rather the
subliminal primes still activated the motor response to which they were mapped in the
instruction. This was also evident in the LRP data. The analysis of the prime-related
LRP showed that partial prime-related response activation was visible starting at about
250 ms post-prime and lasting for approximately 150 ms. Separate analyses for response
activation for response-compatible and -incompatible trials showed that this early prime-
induced response activation was reliable for the compatible trials only. In contrast, there
was again no reliable early prime-related response activation on the NoGo-trials. Why is
prime-related response activation evident for Go- but not for NoGo-trials? One possible
explanation is that the appearance of the NoGo-signal led to a fast inhibition of motor
activity induced by the primes resulting in smaller LRP amplitudes for NoGo-trials. It is
a question for further research to investigate under which conditions automatic response
activation by subliminal primes may also be observed on NoGo-trials.
3.5 Experiment 5: Emotional action-effects - a pilot study
3.5.1 Introduction
In Experiments 1-3 action-effects with visual, directly perceivable features have been used.
However, action-effects in everyday life are often not only characterized by their sensory
features, but also have subjective, e.g., emotional features and differ with respect to the
motivational significance they have for an agent. It seems likely that codes of emotional
features are also integrated into action representations and play an important role in
action control (Beckers et al., 2002; Hommel, in press). In research on decision making
this idea is of course by no means new. For instance, Damasio (1994) assumes that
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performing actions produces positive or negative outcomes, which trigger specific somatic
states. These somatic states then become associated with representations of the action and
are assumed to bias subsequent decision-making processes and choices between actions.
This process is similar to the acquisition of action-effect associations. If humans have to
decide how to act in a certain situation they can anticipate which somatic states each action
would lead to and base their decision on these ”somatic markers”. Damasio (1994) assumes
that a distributed neural network is responsible for the acquisition and use of such links
between actions and somatic markers. Of central importance is the orbitofrontal cortex,
which is assumed to be critically involved in the association of anticipated action-effects
and somatic markers (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991).
There is initial evidence that the emotional valence of action-effects does in fact
influence the selection of future actions. A study by Beckers et al. (2002) indicates that
affective action-effect codes are also integrated in action representations along with other
features. They used an instrumental learning paradigm with an acquisition-phase and a
test-phase. During the acquisition-phase participants had to move a response key up- or
downwards in reaction to a Go-signal. One of the two actions was consistently followed
by an aversive electrocutaneous stimulus (negative action-effect). The other action was
never followed by this aversive stimulus (”positive” action-effect). In the test-phase words
with a negative or positive valence were presented and the task for the participants was to
indicate whether the word they had just seen was a noun or an adjective (again by moving
a response key up or down). After each response the same effect which had been produced
by this effect during the acquisition-phase was administered. The results showed that
responses that were consistently followed by a positive effect were emitted faster in response
to positive targets and responses associated with negative effects were emitted faster in
response to negative targets. While this result indicates that the congruence between
the emotional valences of imperative stimuli and the emotional valences of action-effects
influences response selection, to date it has not been shown whether the emotional valence
of anticipated action-effects can influence free-choice actions. If the emotional valence of an
action-effect becomes integrated into the action representations like other sensory features,
it seems likely that perceiving or anticipating action-effects that have been associated with
a positive or negative valence exert a differential influence on free-choices between actions.
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Such a finding would be theoretically important because it would show that response
priming by action-effects is not a completely automatic process, but rather modulated by
the emotional significance of the action-effects. To investigate whether the anticipation of
action-effects which have been associated with different valences influences the response
choice in a free-choice task Experiment 5 was conducted. Experiment 5 consisted of an
acquisition- and a test-phase. Unlike in the previous experiment, the action-effect primes
of the test-phase of Experiment 5 were presented above the threshold of awareness (i.e.,
supraliminal). Thus no additional control tasks investigating the visibility of the effect-
primes were necessary.
3.5.2 Method
Participants
Twenty-one volunteers (students from the Dresden University of Technology; age 18-29,
mean age 23.5; 16 female, all right handed) participated in Experiment 5. All of them had
normal or corrected to normal vision and reported no history of neurological or psychiatric
disorders. They either received course credit or Euro 5 per hour for their participation.
Stimuli, procedure, and design
Acquisition-phase
The stimuli used in the acquisition-phase are shown in Figure 3.25. The cross used as
a Go-signal extended 1.10 of visual angle. 30 pictures from the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) (15 with a positive and 15 with
a negative emotional valence) served as action-effects. The positive and negative pictures
only differed with respect to their valences (7.5 for positive and 2.63 for the negative
pictures). The arousal was held constant (mean arousal value of the positive pictures
was 4.8 and for the negative pictures 5.06) (see appendix A and B). The pictures were
accompanied by one of two action-effect-tones (either 500 or 800 Hz; 200 ms duration).
Each trial of the acquisition-phase started with the presentation of a cross at the
center of the screen. Immediately after the appearance of the cross the participants had to
choose to press one of the two possible response keys. 50 ms after the key-press a picture
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Free-Choice
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+
Figure 3.25: The sequence of events on a trial of the acquisition-phase of Experiment 5.
After a Go-signal participants pressed one of two possible response keys. Shortly after the free-choice
key-press an affective pictures accompanied by a tone appeared as action-effect.
accompanied by a tone appeared for 500 ms, which were both contingent on the given
response. For each subject, the mapping of responses to pictures and tones was constant
during the experiment (e.g., a right key-press was always followed by a positive picture
and a 500 Hz tone). The mapping of responses to tones and pictures was counterbalanced
across subjects. After an ITI of 1000 ms a new trial started. The acquisition-phase con-
sisted of 200 trials and 10 additional practice trials (with neutral pictures and a different
tone as action-effects) before the main block.
Free-choice test-phase
The effect-tones used in the acquisition-phase served as imperative stimuli in the test-
phase. Each trial started with the presentation of a cross accompanied by one of the two
tones from the acquisition-phase. After the tone subjects were asked to freely choose to
press one of the two keys already known from the acquisition-phase. They were instructed
to choose the key as spontaneously as possible and not to think about which key to press.
After an inter-trial-interval (ITI) of 1000 ms a new trial started. The test-phase consisted
of 100 trials divided into 2 blocks (each tone was presented randomly 50 times). Before
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the main block 10 practice trials were administered. The independent variable was the
emotional valence of the effect-tone (positive, negative). The dependent variable was the
frequency of key-choices (acquisition-consistent vs. acquisition-inconsistent).
3.5.3 Results
Acquisition-phase
Both action-effects (i.e., high vs. low tones and positive vs. negative pictures) were pro-
duced equally often by the participant (t(20) = -.43, p > .60).
Free-choice test-phase
An ANOVA with the factors emotional valence (negative, positive) and consistency (acqui-
sition-consistent vs. acquisition-inconsistent choices) revealed a significant main effect of
consistency due to overall significantly more acquisition-consistent than inconsistent key-
choices (59% [SE mean 3.4] vs. 41% [SE mean 3.4]; F (1,20) = 6.67, MSe = 239.67, p <
.02) (see Figure 3.26). The main effect of emotional valence as well as the interaction of
emotional valence-by-consistency did not reach significance (p > .50 and p > .50, respec-
tively). However, separate analyses for the two affect conditions revealed that the effect
of consistency was only reliable for tones that had been associated with a positive emo-
tional valence (30.7% [SE mean 2.4] vs. 19.1% [SE mean 2.3] for acquisition-consistent and
acquisitition-inconsistent key choices, respectively; t(20) = 2.4, p < .03). The analogous
difference was not reliable for the negatively associated effect-tones (27.9% [SE mean 2.5]
vs. 22.2% [SE mean 2.5] for acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent choices, respectively;
t(20) = 1.13, p > .20).
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Figure 3.26: Mean response choice frequency in the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 5.
3.5.4 Discussion
Experiment 5 was conducted to investigate if free-choice actions are influenced by the emo-
tional valence of the anticipated consequences of the action. The results of the acquisition-
phase indicated that on average both action-effects were experienced equally often and
should therefore have been associated with the actions to equal degrees. The free-choice
test-phase revealed a response bias in the sense that participants more frequently chose
the responses that had been associated with the effect-stimuli in the acquisition-phase,
compared to acquisition-inconsistent responses. Planned comparison showed that this ef-
fect was reliable only for action-effects that had been associated with a positive emotional
valence. If negatively valenced action-effects were presented as imperative stimuli in the
free-choice test-phase, no reliable response bias was obtained. That the two conditions
(positive vs. negative action-effect primes) produced different results indicates that the
affective codes of the action-effects were automatically integrated into the action repre-
sentation during the acquisition-phase. For the positively associated action-effects, the
perception of one feature of the action representation (the effect-tone) obviously led to
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the activation of the remaining parts of the representation, including affective codes and
motor codes. This result is in line with the findings by Beckers et al. (2002) and the ideas
of Damasio (1994) discussed above.
There are at least two possible explanations for the non-reliable response bias when
negatively valenced action effects served as imperative stimuli in the test-phase. First,
the strength of the association between the response codes and the effect codes during the
acquisition-phase might have been weaker in the negative condition. This seems unlikely
in the light of previous findings indicating that the binding of response codes and effects
codes occurs automatically (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). A second explanation is that both
negatively and positively valenced action-effects initially led to an activation of the as-
sociated responses, but that in the negative condition this activation was inhibited later
on because the anticipated negative affect associated with the action-effect (i.e., the tone
stimulus) was aversive and thus elicited a tendency to avoid the action producing this effect
(Gray, 1990). By contrast, encountering a positively valenced action-effect should have
facilitated the activation of the corresponding action by inducing an approach-oriented
response.
The results of Experiment 5 are relevant for ideomotor theories of action control in
general by showing that the emotional valence of action-effects becomes integrated into
action representations as well. Importantly, response priming or selection by features
of former action-effects seems to be modulated by emotional and motivational factors.
Specifically, the results of Experiment 5 indicate that the degree to which an action-effect
activates associated motor codes (or whether this activation leads to response execution)
depends on the emotional valence of the action-effect.
Chapter 4
General discussion
4.1 Summary of the results
The general aim of this dissertation was to investigate the role of action-effects in ac-
tion control. For this purpose five experiments using behavioral and electrophysiological
measures (EEG) were conducted, supplemented by methodological control experiments.
Two main questions motivated this thesis. The first major question was whether the
presentation of subliminal (i.e., not consciously perceivable) action-effects automatically
activates motor responses, which formerly have been experienced to cause these effects.
If so, can this (partial) response priming by action-effects bias free-choice actions? To
address these points Experiments 1-3 were performed. Each experiment consisted of two
experimental phases. The acquisition-phase was a learning phase in which simple key-
press actions were followed by simple visual stimuli, that were contingent on the actions.
Immediately after the acquisition-phase the test-phase followed, in which participants per-
formed free-choice actions after the presentation of a Go-signal. In Experiments 2 and 3
a NoGo-signal indicating that a response had to be withheld could appear with the same
likelihood as the Go-signal. Unknown to the participants, one of the former action-effects
was presented subliminally prior to each Go- and NoGo-signal. Additionally, two control
tasks and a questionnaire were administered to investigate whether the primes indeed re-
mained unconscious and whether they were generally able to influence behavior. The fact
that the action-effects presented during the acquisition-phases were neither task-relevant
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nor had a specific meaning for the participants and could thus be ignored supports the
assumption of an automatic integration of the motor codes of action and the sensory
codes of their effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Taken together, the results obtained in
the test-phase provided strong evidence that even subliminally presented action-effects
can automatically activate corresponding motor codes. Under certain circumstances the
partial response activation was found to bias free-choice actions although participants ex-
perienced the actions as freely chosen. The response priming by action-effects became
evident in the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), an electrophysiological indicator of
response activation. At least three factors seemed to influence which responses were cho-
sen and executed: The strength of the priming effect, the complexity of the task (i.e.,
pure Go-blocks or intermixed Go/NoGo-blocks), and the elapsed time between the prime
stimulus and the Go-signal. Control tasks confirmed that the experimental setup was
in principle suited to investigate unconscious response priming and supported the major
findings of Experiments 1-3. In particular, forced-choice discrimination tasks showed that
the primes were indeed not consciously perceived as indicated by the fact that participants
were not able to identify the masked primes better than chance. Moreover, forced-choice
priming tasks proved that the masked (effects)-primes used in the free-choice test-phase
were indeed able to activate motor responses to which they had been explicitly mapped
in the instruction.
A secondary question of this thesis concerned the role of emotional features of action-
effects. In Experiment 5 I investigated whether the emotional valence of action-effects is
automatically integrated into action representations (as has been shown for other sensory
features of action-effects) and whether the prime-induced anticipation of action-effects with
different emotional valences exert different influences on free-choice actions. To address
this question, in Experiment 5 simple key-press actions were linked to action-effects with
different emotional valences (positive vs. negative pictures accompanied by high or low
tones) during the acquisition-phase. In the subsequent test-phase, the effect-tones that
had been associated with negative or positive pictures were presented and followed by a
Go-signal, after which participants had to freely choose to press one of the two response
keys. Results indicated that the emotional valences of action-effects are automatically
integrated into action representations and that the anticipation of the emotional valence
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of an action-effect influences free-choice actions. Whereas the effect-tones induced a clear
response bias (i.e., more acquisition-consistent than -inconsistent key-choices) when they
had been associated with a positive emotional valence, this response bias was not reliable
for action-effects associated with negative emotional features.
In summary, the present results provide further proof for ideomotor theories of ac-
tion control (James, 1890; Elsner & Hommel, 2001). They showed that the presentation
of action-effect features automatically activates associated response codes, even if the
effect-representation remains below the threshold of conscious awareness. Moreover, the
results showed that the response activation induced by subliminal effect-primes can bias
free-choice actions. Whether or not prime-induced response activation becomes evident in
the actual execution of the primed response depends, however, on a number of additional
factors including task complexity, temporal factors, and the emotional valence of the an-
ticipated action-effects. The next sections of this chapter will discuss the obtained results
in more detail. The discussion will start with a closer look at the boundary conditions
and the time course of response priming induced by subliminal action-effects.
4.2 Unconscious response priming by action-effects
4.2.1 Automatic response activation by effect representations
One of the main questions of this dissertation was whether or not action-effects, which have
been associated with simple responses, are able to automatically activate their associated
motor codes even if they are presented subliminally and processed unconsciously. Exper-
iments 2 and 3 were conducted to directly answer this question by using the LRP as an
indicator of response activation. The results of the test-phase of both experiments revealed
acquisition-consistent prime-induced motor activation, that is, the subliminal effect-primes
activated the responses that had been associated with them during the acquisition-phase.
This was in particular true for the Go-trials, on which a free-choice response had to be
executed. This finding suggests that the sensory features of former action-effects auto-
matically activated responses with which they had been associated during the acquisition-
phase. This response activation was evident in the LRP starting about 150-200 ms after
the onset of the action-effect primes and is in accordance with ideomotor views of action
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control, which assume that actions are automatically activated by anticipating their con-
sequences (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Harless, 1861; Hoffmann, 1993; James, 1890; Lotze,
1850; Prinz, 1997). The results are also in accordance with a brain imaging study by El-
sner et al. (2002) which showed increased activity in the caudal supplementary motor area
while participants merely perceived former action-effects. Importantly, the results of the
present experiments indicate that action-effects do not have to be consciously perceived
or anticipated to activate associated motor patterns. The fact that action-effect stimuli
that were kept below the threshold of awareness nevertheless induced reliable response
activation provides strong support for the assumption that response priming by action
effects is indeed an automatic process. Since the effect-primes in the present experiments
were subliminal, their influence on the response activation as indicated by the LRP cannot
be attributed to conscious expectations or intentional strategies (which may have played
a role in earlier studies using supraliminal effect-primes).
At first glance, the idea that unconscious effect representations automatically influ-
ence behavior by activating associated actions may seem counterintuitive. However, in
everyday life such a mechanism appears adaptive because it supports the fast selection
of appropriate actions depending on environmental conditions. We often act appropriate
without conscious deliberation and may even find it difficult to say why we did what we
did (Bargh, 2005). One example is shifting gears while driving a car. Once we have learned
which actions are necessary to operate the gear shift we automatically shift to a higher
gear if we feel that we drive faster or if we hear that the engine sounds too loud. In a
highly experienced driver, the increased noise automatically activates a goal representa-
tion (to reduce the noise level of the engine) and this goal representation activates motor
codes, which have been learned to produce the intended effect (i.e., gear shifting actions).
The automatic activation of the gear shifting goal by specific stimulus conditions and the
automatic activation of actions suited to attain this goal reduce the demands on processing
resources and thus allow us to perform other actions at the same time (e.g., following a
conversation while driving). If looking at the car driving example above, one precondition
for automatic response priming by action-effects in most everyday life actions seems to
be practice (Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2002). Before automatic response priming by effect
anticipation can take place the effect that an action will produce has to be known. This
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action - effect (R-E) learning process is likely to be mediated by awareness. However,
after the association between an action and its effects has been formed the realization
of the effect (i.e., the recruitment of appropriate actions to obtain this effect) does not
necessarily have to be conscious.
Possible influences of response priming strength on response choices
In the experiments reported here, automatic response activation by action-effects seemed
to be overall weaker or even absent on trials on which participants chose the acquisition-
inconsistent key after the presentation of the primes (i.e., the response which was not
associated with the effect-prime). One possible explanation for this finding is that the
effect-primes did not induce equally strong motor activation on each trial. If the activation
of effect feature codes by the primes remains below a certain threshold, this activation will
not be strong enough to prime the associated responses (Hommel, 2003). As a consequence,
participants’ free choices between the alternative actions will not be biased by the effect-
primes. Thus according to this interpretation, the likelihood of prime-consistent response-
choices was greater on trials with a large prime-related LRP, indicating strong response
priming by the action-effects. It should be noted that this interpretation is based on purely
correlational evidence (i.e., smaller prime-induced response activation on trials on which
participants chose the prime-inconsistent action), and further research would be required to
provide evidence for a causal relationship between the strength of prime-induced response
activation and the prime-induced biasing of free-choice actions.
Response activation on NoGo-trials
Whereas reliable evidence for response activation by subliminal effect-primes was obtained
on the Go-trials of the free-choice test-phases, less clear results were observed on NoGo-
trials. In contrast, several EEG studies have shown that partial response activation is
visible even if a stimulus-triggered response has to be inhibited after the appearance of a
NoGo-signal (Miller & Hackley, 1992; Osman et al., 1992). Furthermore, Schlaghecken and
Eimer (2001) provided evidence that even a large number of NoGo-trials in a forced-choice
reaction task do not reduce the effects of subliminal primes on behavioral performance. In
the light of these findings, reliable prime-induced response activation was expected also on
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the NoGo-trials in the experiments reported here. Consistent with this prediction, in the
test-phase of Experiment 2 planned comparisons revealed a reliable response activation
on NoGo-trial of similar magnitude than on Go-trials. However, this result could neither
be replicated in the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 3 nor in the forced-choice task of
Experiment 4. In Experiment 4, prime-induced response activation was overall weaker as
indicated by smaller LRP amplitudes on the Go-trials relative to the LRPs in the forced-
choice priming tasks of Experiments 2 and 3. Since this may also explain the non-reliable
priming effect on the NoGo-trials, further research is clearly needed to elucidate this issue.
4.2.2 Unconscious effects representations can bias free-choice actions
The present LRP results consistently showed that unconsciously presented action-effects
do indeed automatically induce a partial activation of associated motor patterns. However,
the free-choice performance was found to vary across experiments. Consistent with earlier
studies (Elsner & Hommel, 2001) more acquisition-consistent relative to -inconsistent re-
sponses were chosen in the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 1. Such a prime-induced
response bias was predicted from the perspective of ideomotor theories of action control.
If the perception of action-effect features automatically triggers associated motor patterns,
this activation should also influence response choices. The relative small magnitude of the
observed response bias (53% acquisition-consistent vs. 47% -inconsistent choices) is unsur-
prising given that participants’ choices were also influenced by factors other than motor
activation induced by action-effect features (for instance, some participants may have used
idiosyncratic strategies to make their choices, which may have attenuated the subtle in-
fluence of the subliminal primes). Further, response activation and response execution
(i.e., the implementation of the response) are believed to be independent processes (El-
sner & Hommel, in press). Therefore, even if the effect-primes automatically activate their
associated response codes this does not mean that this activation leads to an automatic
execution of the primed response. An influence of this action-effect based priming-effect
on action initiation and execution is however possible (Kunde et al., 2002; Kunde et al.,
2004; Kunde, 2006), especially in cases where action-effect associations are very stable and
not much top-down control is needed (e.g., in well-practiced musicians).
By contrast to Experiment 1, no response bias was obtained in Experiments 2 and 3
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(i.e., an equal number of acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent responses were chosen).
What could be reasons for this finding? One possible explanation for the missing response
bias could be that response priming was overall weaker in Experiments 2 and 3 as compared
to Experiment 1. Fewer primes than in Experiment 1 could have reached the necessary
threshold to induce sufficient effect-feature activation, which would then also not lead to
an activation of associated motor codes. However, this explanation seems unlikely as the
action-effects and masks used in the Experiments 1 and 2 were identical in their physical
appearance (the effect-stimuli and mask used in Experiment 3 varied slightly in shape
and color from those of Experiment 1 and 2). Another, more likely, explanation for the
equal number of acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent response-choices in Experiments
2 and 3 is, that the prime-induced response bias depends on the complexity of the task,
i.e., whether additional processes intervened between the onset of the effect-prime and the
response-choice. In the test-phase of Experiment 1 only Go-trials were used, thus responses
could be executed immediately after the appearance of the Go-signal without any need
to further process the Go-signal. By contrast, in Experiments 2 and 3 responses could
not be executed that fast because a NoGo-signal could appear as well and thus a more
detailed elaboration of the signal-stimulus was necessary. This additional discrimination
process was time consuming, as indicated by longer RTs to the Go-signal in Experiments 2
and 3 as compared to Experiment 1. It is possible that this further attentional processing
attenuated or even eliminated the already small response biases induced by the subliminal
effect-primes. Furthermore, and also due to the Go/NoGo-design, participants had to stay
more focused on the task in Experiments 2 and 3 as compared to Experiment 1 as they
had to elaborate the ’Go’-signal in more detail. The increased recruitment of top-down
(intentional) control could have reduced the influence of automatic, bottom-up processes
on subsequent behavior. The automatically induced motor activity by the effect-primes
might thus not have been strong enough to bias response choices in Experiments 2 and 3. In
Experiment 1 the task was simpler and required less top-down processing, as participants
simply had to press a key as soon as the Go-signal appeared. This presumably led to a
stronger prime-induced bottom-up response activation, resulting in a greater influence of
the effect-primes at the response execution stage (cf. de Jong et al., 1999). Alternatively,
the response bias in the free-choice test-phase could also depend on the time interval
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between prime-onset and response execution. As noted above, the response bias was only
found if responses could be executed immediately after the presentation of the effect-
primes, i.e., at a point in time when prime-induced response activation was probably
maximal. A simple postponement of response execution would probably lead to a decay
(or inhibition) of prime-related motor activity and thus an attenuated or even eliminated
response bias. This hypothesis will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Although the question if subliminally presented action-effects can bias free-choice
responses is interesting in itself the main question of this dissertation was if they are able
to induce associated motor activity. That the latter was indeed the case has been clearly
shown by the LRP data from the free-choice test-phases of Experiments 2 and 3.
4.2.3 The time course of the unconscious response priming effect
Once an association between motor codes and effect codes is established via learning, the
effect codes can automatically ”trigger” their corresponding motor codes. As noted above,
such automatic and unconscious response-priming is helpful if the activated response is the
one required in a given task or situation or if it is the one most likely leading to a desired
result. However, inhibition of automatically activated response tendencies may also be
necessary on some occasions, for instance when inappropriate response tendencies have
been triggered or if a quick modification of an activated response is required. Numerous
studies have shown that response inhibition plays an important role in action control, for
instance, by using stop-signal or Go/NoGo tasks (e.g., De Jong, Coles, Logan, & Gratton,
1990; De Jong, Coles, & Logan, 1995; Eimer, 1993; Kok 1986; Logan & Cowan, 1984).
In these experiments response inhibition is initiated once a stimulus is recognized which
signals the observer to refrain from responding. This type of inhibition is voluntary (in-
tentional) and optional and thought to be mediated by executive mechanisms in prefrontal
cortex (Band & Boxtel, 1999).
For a long time it has been argued that inhibitory control is restricted to consciously
perceivable stimulation (e.g., Allport, Tipper, & Chmiel, 1985; McCormick, 1997; Marcel,
1980; Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995). However, recently it has been shown that inhibi-
tion may also result from unconscious processes. Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) provided
evidence that motor activity triggered by unconscious stimuli is automatically inhibited
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after some time (at approximately 300 ms after the onset of the primes; see 2.3.2, 20 for
details on the activation-followed-by-inhibition hypothesis). This activation-followed-by-
inhibition process is not evident for consciously perceived primes, suggesting that different
mechanisms are recruited by the cognitive system depending on the conscious availability
of information. Whereas intentional regulatory mechanisms may be employed to prevent
the execution of ”unwanted” response tendencies under conscious conditions (Houghton
& Tipper, 1994), an automatic inhibitory process is necessary to regulate the suppression
of motor activity triggered by unconscious stimuli of which we are not aware. Could such
exogenous response inhibition also affect the time course of unconscious response-priming
by action-effects? In Experiments 1, 2 and 4 such an inhibitory mechanisms seems unlikely
because the time between the onset of the prime and the onset of the Go- or NoGo-signal
was too short for inhibition to be initiated. The LRP data from the free-choice test-phases
of these experiments support this assumption because no inhibitory processes were evident
in the LRPs from the acquisition-consistent and -inconsistent trials. Also, the behavioral
results of the forced-choice priming tasks of Experiments 1, 2 and 4 revealed positive
compatibility effects (i.e., shorter RTs for compatible as compared to incompatible trials)
suggesting that no inhibition took place (this was also confirmed by no reliable inhibitory
activity in the LRP data from these tasks).
By contrast, the results obtained during the free-choice test-phase of Experiment
3 support the speculation that motor responses activated by the effect-primes were (at
least to some extent) subsequently inhibited. In Experiment 3, the duration of the mask
after the prime was longer as in Experiments 1, 2 and 4 (100 ms vs. 16 ms), which
led to an increased SOA between prime and Go/NoGo-signal. This additional time was
presumably sufficient for the mobilisation of automatic inhibitory processes (Eimer &
Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002). Consistent with this assumption, the LRP
obtained from the Go-trials of the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 3 showed that
the unconscious effect-primes activated their associated responses. This initial response
activation returned to the baseline after approximately 100 ms as would be expected
for automatic inhibitory processes (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). Similar results were
obtained with the forced-choice priming task of Experiment 3. First, the behavioral data
revealed a clear negative compatibility effect (NCE, i.e., shorter RTs for incompatible
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trials as compared to compatible and neutral trials) which is an indicator for subsequent
automatic response inhibition. Second, the LRPs from the compatible and incompatible
trials of this task exhibited clear prime-related response activation about 150-200 ms
after prime-onset, which was followed by an response inhibition phase ca. 100 ms later.
The LRP from the Go-trials of the free-choice test-phase as well as from the compatible
and incompatible trials of the forced-choice priming task of Experiment 3 did not show a
strong inhibition-related activation of the opposite response as could be expected from data
obtained by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998). The elicited response activity in Experiment
3 merely returned to baseline level. However, the strength of the inhibition effect strongly
depends on the stimuli used as primes, masks, and targets as well as on the prime-target
SOA and therefore varies between experiments (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003).
Taken together automatic inhibition of motor activity initially elicited by effect-
primes may explain the LRP results obtained in the free-choice test-phase of Experiment 3.
Nevertheless, two alternative explanations are possible. First, the motor activity induced
by the effect-primes could simply have decayed. This is unlikely because the time between
the primes and the Go-signal (100 ms) seems too short for a passive decay to occur (prime
- Go-signal SOA = 164 ms). Second, the mask stimulus used in the free-choice test-phase
could have induced response activation opposite from that induced by the prime (Enns
& Llerras, 2005; see 2.3.2, 20 for details on the object-substitution-hypothesis in masked
priming). This explanation also seems unlikely since there was no strong opposite response
activation visible in the LRP obtained during the test-phase of Experiment 3, which should
be the case if the mask had activated the opposite response.
4.2.4 Automatic response activation and the free-will debate
The results of this dissertation provide further evidence that actions are automatically
activated by perceiving or anticipating their consequences, even if representations of such
consequences remain below the threshold of conscious awareness. The term ”automatic”
appears to imply that we cannot influence whether or not actions are initiated by our brain
if certain trigger conditions are encountered. Does this mean that we cannot control our
behavior? Are we completely determined by our learning history, genes and environment?
These kinds of questions are of course not new and it is beyond the scope of this dissertation
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to discuss the issue of free will (see Kane, 2002; Walter, 1999; Dennett, 2003; Pauen, 2004;
Goschke & Walter, 2005). Nevertheless the results presented in this thesis are potentially
of interest in the context of the free-will debate.
One of the first scientists who tried to make empirical contributions to this topic
was the neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet (e.g., Libet et al. 1983). The results of Libet’s
experiments seemed to indicate that the initiation of our voluntary actions is indeed based
on unconscious brain processes. In his experiment, subjects watched a rotating clock hand
in form of a moving light dot which took 2.56 seconds for one rotation. The instruction
for the subjects was to flex spontaneously the wrist of the right hand within a certain
time window. After each movement, they were ask to report either the time at which they
first ’felt the urge’ (the intention) to make this freely willed movement (W judgement) or
the time when they became aware of the actual movement (M judgement). To obtain a
measure of movement-related activity in the brain the EEG was recorded and the readiness
potential (RP; ”Bereitschaftspotential”) was computed as an indicator of response activity
(see 2.3.3, page 26 for details on the RP). The most important and much discussed result
was that the RP started about 250 ms before the reported ’urge to move’, that is, at
a point in time where participants had not yet formed the conscious intention to move.
The authors concluded that the cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins
unconsciously. This suggests that our brain initiates actions before we know that we want
to move. Numerous methodological criticisms and philosophical questions concerning
this result have been raised over the years (e.g., Goschke & Walter, 2006; Trevena &
Miller, 2002; Gomes, 2002). However, the basic finding has been replicated in other
studies and with different methods (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Haggard & Eimer, 1999).
Importantly, other interpretations of this result have been proposed. For instance, Keller
and Heckhausen (1990) suggested that the movements in Libet’s experiments were not -
as assumed by Libet - purely self-paced, but instead reactions to internal stimuli. As the
instruction to monitor the ’urge to move’ or to register the moment at which one first
has the intention to move is very vague, according to Heckhausen and Keller participants
tried to identify some internal signal or indicator of that ’urge’. The perceived urge
to move can then be interpreted as an internal stimulus, which triggered the activation
of a motor pattern. To obtain evidence for their hypothesis, Heckhausen and Keller
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conducted an experiment similar to the one by Libet et al. (1983). The results showed
that during the entire experiment occasionally motor activity was evident (as indicated
by the electromyogram (EMG) and RP) which participants were not aware of. Keller and
Heckhausen (1990) proposed that participants constantly search for some internal event,
which could be the ’urge to move’. What happens occasionally is that unconscious motor
activity, which would otherwise not become conscious, reaches awareness and is interpreted
as the ’urge to move’. If this motor activity signals the ’urge’, it is no longer surprising
that the RP starts before the intention to move becomes conscious.
Can the experience of an intention to move, that is experienced as a free ”act of
the will”, also be induced by external (but unconscious) stimuli? This question could
potentially be answered by an extension of the experimental paradigm used in this disser-
tation. For instance, subliminal effect-primes could be presented at random points in time
during a Libet-like experimental setting. A correlation between the self-reported time of
the ’urge to move’ and the onset-time of the effect-primes could be taken as an indicator
that the urge reflects the conscious experience of an otherwise unconscious event, i.e., that
motor activity induced by the effect-primes reaches consciousness and is interpreted as the
intention or ’urge to move’. Evidence for the assumption that the instruction to indicate
the ’urge to move’ or to report the exact time at which an intention to move becomes
conscious is indeed very vague can also be found in the results of this thesis. After the
free-choice test-phases of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 participants were asked if they had the
feeling that they freely chose to press the keys. The answers to this question were very
inconsistent. Some subjects answered ’yes’ and reported that they decided which key to
press on each trial. However, others answered ’no’, arguing that they were restricted in
their choices by the instruction (either because they were only allowed to press one of
two keys or because they were not allowed to use a specific strategy). This in itself is
an interesting result because it shows that vague instructions, like the one to search for
an intention to move or to ”freely” choose an action, can be misleading or at least be
interpreted in very different ways which makes it difficult to generalize results.
Another alternative interpretation of Libet’s results is based on the assumption
that the participants in Libet’s study did not form an intention to move immediately
before each single movement, but rather formed a general intention at the beginning
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of the experiment, when they received the instruction. Once this conscious intention
(i.e., to perform simple movements at random points in time while watching a clock)
has been formed, it can influence subsequent behavior automatically and unconsciously
(Prinz, 1997; Goschke, 2003; Goschke & Walter, 2006). According to this interpretation
conscious intentions are indirect (not immediate) causes of voluntary actions. Rather
intentions are conceived of as constraints, which modulate response selection processes by
setting certain stimulus-response bindings into readiness. Thus intentions reconfigure the
cognitive system to allow the automatic selection of intention-congruent actions in response
to specific trigger conditions without having to form a conscious intention before each
single movement (cf. Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Neumann & Prinz, 1987). The
results of this thesis show that ”freely” chosen actions can be influenced by unconsciously
activated effect representations. Conscious intentions in turn modulate which effect- or
goal-representations are activated in a given context, thereby biasing which actions are
selected.
4.3 The role of the emotional valence of action-effects in
action control
In Experiments 1-3 I investigated how unconscious priming by learned action-effects in-
fluences response activation processes and free-choice responses. In these experiments
action-effects were used which only differed in their sensory (directly perceivable) fea-
tures. However, in everyday life emotional consequences of actions play an important role
in deciding which action to perform. It is therefore plausible that emotional features (and
other subjective features) of action-effects become integrated into cognitive representa-
tions of actions. Experiment 5 was designed to investigate this question and to examine
whether the anticipation of action-effects with different emotional valences influences free-
choice actions. In the acquisition-phase free-choice key-presses were contingently followed
by positive or negative pictures, which were accompanied by a high or low tone. Dur-
ing the test-phase the effect-tones were presented alone and a free-choice response had
to be executed. The results showed that the effect-tones elicited a response bias (i.e.,
above-chance acquisition-consistent key-choices) only if they were associated with posi-
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tively valenced pictures, that is, if they triggered the anticipation of a positive emotional
effect. By contrast, if the primed sensory effect features were linked to negative emotional
consequences, no response bias was obtained.
At least two explanations for this finding are possible. The first one is that the
response-effect (R-E) associations that were established during the acquisition-phase dif-
fered in their strength for the negative and positive action-effects. However, this expla-
nation is unlikely because the binding of motor codes and action feature codes is believed
to be an automatic process (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). These bindings should there-
fore be equally strong in both affect conditions. The second possible explanation for the
findings of Experiment 5 is that perceiving the action-effect tones elicited different cog-
nitive processes depending on their associated emotional valences. The anticipation of
negatively associated effect-tones could have elicited avoidance or withdrawal tendencies,
whereas perceiving positively associated action-effects may have facilitated approach be-
havior (Gray, 1990; Elliott & Thrash, 2002; Davidson, 2001). Approach and avoidance
behavior clearly depend on the valence of an anticipated action outcome. Several theories
have posited the existence of two basic motivational systems. One system is responsible for
facilitating behavior and/or generating positive affect and one is responsible for inhibiting
behavior and/or generating negative affect (e.g., Lang, 1995; Gray, 1970). Approach and
avoidance systems are believed to constitute a network that mediates immediate affective,
cognitive, and behavioral responses to perceived or imagined stimuli. According to Gray
(1970) the so-called behavioral activation system (BAS) facilitates behavior, generates
positive affect and is sensitive to actual or imagined stimuli associated with reward and
non-punishment (i.e., positive/desirable stimuli). It is accompanied by perceptual vigi-
lance for, affective reactivity to, and a behavioral predisposition toward such stimuli. The
behavioral inhibition system (BIS) inhibits behavior, generates negative affect, is sensitive
to negative/undesirable stimuli (i.e., stimuli representing punishment or non-reward) and
mediates withdrawal behavior. How can these two motivational systems explain the data
from the test-phase of Experiment 5? The anticipation of positively associated action-
effects may have induced an approach tendency towards executing the response which has
been learned to bring about the positive effect and which was automatically activated
by the perception of the sensory effect codes (i.e., the associated effect-tone). Such an
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approach tendency could explain the stronger response bias found for positively valenced
action-effects. On the other hand perceiving negatively valenced effect features could have
evoked an avoidance tendency, leading to inhibition of the response, which was initially
activated by the sensory effect codes, thereby attenuating the prime-induced response bias.
This hypothesis could be tested further in an LRP experiment. Here, response activation
followed by inhibition should be visible for negatively valenced action-effects but not for
positive ones. This approach/avoidance explanation is also in line with research concerning
affective styles (see Davidson & Irwin, 1999 for an overview), in which it is assumed that
emotions guide actions and organize behavior towards goals with an emotional valence.
As noted above, the results of Experiment 5 indicate that affective features of actions
are automatically integrated into action representations. This result is in accordance with
earlier studies (Beckers et. al., 2002; see also Hommel, in press). A possible explanation of
how action-effects become automatically integrated into action representations is provided
by the theory of somatic markers by Damasio (1994) and colleagues. They assume that
positive or negative somatic states are created if an action outcome is perceived and that
these states become associated with the action representation. Making decisions is based
on the anticipation of the somatic states associated with possible actions alternatives.
Damasio (1991) proposed that a distributed network of brain structures, including the
orbitofrontal cortex, the amygdala, and the somato-sensory cortex, is responsible for the
acquisition and usage of such links between actions and somatic markers. This proposal
is supported by studies of patients with lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex, who have been
shown to make disadvantageous choices, which are assumed to result from an impaired
ability to generate somatic markers and to anticipate future emotional consequences of
possible actions (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Bechara, Tranel, Dama-
sio, & Damasio, 1996). It should be noted, however, that this explanation of how the
emotional valence of action-effects might have influenced voluntary choices in Experiment
5 are still speculative. Further experiments are needed to provide direct evidence for
this hypothesis. Such experiments should also take into account individual differences in
emotional responsivity (e.g., the relative dominance of behavioral approach and avoidance
systems; cf. Davidson & Irwin, 1999).
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4.4 Conclusion
From a more general perspective, the results of this dissertation are consistent with the
hypothesis, that conscious intentions or goals are not always immediate ”triggering causes”
of specific responses, but rather more indirect causes for actions. Intentions configure the
cognitive system such that specific response dispositions are set into a state of increased
readiness, which enables the quick selection of appropriate actions in response to specific
execution conditions (e.g., Goschke, 1996, 2003; Hoffmann, 1993; Hommel, 2000; Kunde,
Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Neumann & Prinz, 1987). This form of intentional modulation
of response dispositions is based on learned contingencies between actions and their effects,
which starts from birth and continues throughout one’s lifetime. As a result of such
learning processes, connections between contexts, actions, and the consequences of actions
are formed, which can then be used for voluntary action control. In particular, actions
can be initiated by anticipating their effects.
While this is by no means a new idea, the experiments conducted in this dissertation
have yielded a number of novel insights into the mechanisms underlying action control.
First, it was shown that effect representations do not have to be conscious in order to
become effective. Rather, the subliminal activation of action-effects can automatically
activate associated actions, which have been learned to produce this effect. Thus at least
for the admittedly very simple actions and effects used in the present experiments, one may
conclude that responses can be activated by unconscious ”goals” (i.e., subliminally primed
action-effects). It is, of course, a question for further research under which conditions
unconsciously activated goals may also play a functional role in the selection of more
complex actions (for evidence that this may in fact be the case see e.g., Bargh, 2005).
Importantly, the present results also showed that response activation by effect-primes is in
some cases subject to inhibitory or further evaluative processes, which modulate whether
or not the primed action will actually be executed.
Finally, it could be shown that the emotional valence of anticipated consequences
of actions is automatically integrated into action representations along with other (sen-
sory) features of the actions effect and (presumably automatically) modulates free-choices
between alternative actions. Taken together, combining free-choice tasks and LRP mea-
surements with ideomotor approaches as done in this thesis have increased our current
knowledge of the mechanisms underlying action control.
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Annäherungen. In C. Herrmann, M. Pauen, J. Rieger, & S. Schicktanz (Hrsg.), Bewusstsein im
Perspektivenwechsel zwischen den Disziplinen. UTB.
Grafton, S. T., Arbib, M. A., Fadiga, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996) Localization of grasp represen-
tations in humans by positrone emission tomography. 2. Observation compared with imagination.
Experimental Brain Research, 112, 103-11.
CHAPTER 5. REFERENCES 118
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G. H., Sirevaag, E. J., Eriksen, C. W., & Donchin, E. (1988). Pre- and
poststimulus activation of response channels: A psychophysiological analysis. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14, 331-344.
Gray, J.A. (1970). The psychophysiological basis of introversion-extroversion. Behavior Research
and Therapy, 8, 249-266.
Gray, J.A. (1990). Brain systems that mediate both emotion and cognition. Cognition and Emo-
tion, 4(2), 369-288.
Greenwald, A. G. (1970a). A choice reaction time test of ideomotor theory. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, 86, 20-25.
Greenwald, A. G. (1970b). A double-stimulation test of ideomotor theory with implications for
selective attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 84, 392-398.
Hacker, W. (1998). Allgemeine Arbeitspsychologie. Psychische Struktur und Regulation von Ar-
beitstätigkeiten. Bern/Stuttgart/Toronto: Huber.
Haggard, P., & Eimer M. (1999). On the relation between brain potentials and the awareness of
voluntary movements. Experimental Brain Research,126, 128-133.
Harless, E. (1861). Der Apparat des Willens [The apparatus of will]. Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie
und philosophische Kritik, 38, 50-73.
Hazeltine, E. (2002). The representational nature of sequence learning: Evidence for goal-based
codes. In W. Prinz, & B. Hommel (Eds.), Common mechanisms in perception and action: Atten-
tion & Performance XIX (pp. 673-689). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hommel, B. (1993). Inverting the Simon effect by intention: Determinants of direction and extent
of effects of irrelevant spatial information. Psychological Research, 55, 270-279.
Hommel, B. (1996). The cognitive representation of action: Automatic integration of perceived
action-effects. Psychological Research, 59, 176-186.
Hommel, B. (1997). Toward an action-concept model of stimulus-response compatibility. In B.
Hommel & W. Prinz (Eds.), Theoretical issues in stimulus-response compatibility (pp. 281-320).
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Hommel, B. (1998). Event files: Evidence for automatic integration of stimulus-response episodes.
Visual Cognition, 5, 183-216.
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. (2001). The theory of event coding
(TEC): A framework for perception and action planning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 849-
878.
Hommel , B. Alonso, D., & Fuentes, L.J. (2003): Acquisition and generalization of action effects.
Visual Cognition, 10 (8), 965-986.
Hommel, B. (2003). Acquisition and control of voluntary action. In S. Maasen, W. Prinz, & G.
Roth (Eds.), Voluntary action: Brains, minds, and sociality (pp. 34-48). Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
CHAPTER 5. REFERENCES 119
Hommel, B. (in press). How we do what we want: A neuro-cognitive perspective on human action
planning. In R. J. Jorna, W. van Wezel, & A. Meystel (Eds.), Planning in intelligent systems:
Aspects, motivations and methods. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Hoffmann, J. (1993). Vorhersage und Erkenntnis. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Hoffman, J., & Sebald, A. (2000) Lernmechanismen zum Erwerb verhaltenssteuernden Wissens.
[Learning mechanisms for the acquisition of action-controlling knowledge]. Psychologische Rund-
schau, 51, 1-9.
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Chapter 6
Zusammenfassung
Einleitung: Unser alltägliches Leben beinhaltet eine Vielzahl zielgerichteter Handlungen.
Zielgerichtetes Handeln setzt voraus, dass der Akteur vor der Ausführung einer Handlung
weiss, welchen Effekt seine Handlung haben wird. So betätigen wir den Lichtschalter,
wenn wir einen Raum aufhellen möchten. Am Beginn jeder Handlung scheint somit die
mentale Repräsentation des erwünschten Zielzustand (d.h. des Handlungseffekts) zu ste-
hen, welcher dann die Selektion der angemessenen Handlung kontrolliert. Daraus ergeben
sich zwei Fragen: Erstens, wie entstehen die mentalen Repräsentationen von Handlungsef-
fekten und zweitens, wie werden diese eingesetzt, um Handlungen auszuwählen bzw. zu
steuern. Erste theoretische Annahmen zur Rolle von Handlungseffekten bei der Steuerung
von Handlungen formulierten Lotze (1852) und Harless (1861; siehe auch James, 1890).
Die Autoren gingen von einem zweistufigen Prozess der Handlungskontrolle aus. Zunächst
werden, in einem frühen Lernstadium, Handlungen willkürlich ausgeführt. Die Effekte
(Veränderungen in der Umgebung), die diese Handlungen nach sich ziehen, werden re-
gistriert und eine bi-direktionale Verbindung zwischen Handlung und Effekt wird geformt.
Später kann aufgrund des Gelernten die eigentliche Handlungskontrolle erfolgen. Dann
führt die Antizipation des Handlungseffekts (über Wahrnehmung oder Vorstellung) zu
einer automatischen Aktivierung derjenigen Handlung, die mit dem Effekt zuvor assoziiert
wurde (d.h. jener Handlung, die ihn im Lernprozess hervorgerufen hat). In jüngerer Zeit
haben experimentelle Untersuchungen gezeigt, dass Handlungen, die zuvor mit bestimmten
Effekten assoziiert wurden, durch die Antizipation dieser Effekte aktiviert werden können
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(z.B. Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Kunde, 2001; Hommel, 2003).
Fragestellung und Methoden: Trotz erster Hinweise (Kunde, 2004) konnte bisher nicht
vollständig geklärt werden, ob Handlungseffekte immer bewusst antizipiert werden müssen,
um assoziierte Handlungen zu aktivieren oder ob unbewusste Antizipation ausreichend
ist. Desweiteren ist der Einfluss emotionaler Eigenschaften von Handlungseffekten auf die
Handlungskontrolle noch nicht eingehend untersucht worden. Diese zwei zentralen Fragen
motivierten diese Arbeit. Zu ihrer Untersuchung wurden fünf Experimente durchgeführt.
Neben Verhaltensdaten wurden dabei auch elektrophysiologische Parameter mit Hilfe des
Elektroenzephalogramms (EEG) erhoben. Erstens sollte untersucht werden, inwieweit
subliminal dargebotene Handlungseffekte (d.h. Handlungseffekte, die nicht bewusst wahr-
genommen werden) automatisch diejenigen Handlungen aktivieren mit denen sie zuvor
assoziiert wurden. Daran schliesst sich die Frage an, ob eine derartige automatische
Reaktionsaktivierung durch Handlungseffekte, die freie Handlungswahl beeinflusst. Zur
Klärung dieser Fragen wurden drei Experimente (1-3) durchgeführt. Jedes der Experi-
mente bestand aus vier Teilen - einer Lernphase, einer Testphase, einer Wahlreaktions-
aufgabe sowie einer Reizdiskriminationsaufgabe (wobei die letzteren beiden, wie auch Ex-
periment 4, zur Kontrolle der Wirksamkeit der verwendeten Reize dienten). Während
der Lernphase sollten die Probanden auf ein Startsignal hin eine von zwei möglichen Tas-
ten drücken. Als Reaktion auf den Tastendruck und in Abhängigkeit von diesem erschien
ein spezifischer visueller Handlungseffekt auf dem Bildschirm (z.B. linke Taste > Quadrat,
rechte Taste > Raute). In der Testphase bestand die Aufgabe darin, nach Erscheinen eines
Startsignals eine der beiden, bereits aus der Lernphase bekannten, Tasten, nach freier
Wahl zu drücken. Ohne das Wissen der Probanden wurde jeweils vor dem Startsignal
einer der beiden Handlungseffekte aus der Lernphase subliminal dargeboten. In den Ex-
perimenten 2 und 3 gab es zusätzlich zu dem Startsignal noch einen weiteren Reiz, welcher
keine Reaktion verlangte. Nach Erscheinen dieses Reizes sollten die Probanden einfach
auf den Beginn des nächsten Durchgangs warten. Die Hypothese war, dass die Probanden
in der Testphase vermehrt mit der Lernphase konsistente Tastendrücke ausführen, d.h.
wenn die linke Taste in der Lernphase mit einem Quadrat assoziiert wurde, sollte nach
der subliminalen Darbietung des Quadrates in der Testphase häufiger die linke Reaktion
gewählt werden. Während der Testphase (und der Wahlreaktionsaufgabe) von Experi-
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ment 2 und 3 wurde das EEG aufgezeichnet und das lateralisierte Bereitschaftspotential
(LBP), ein Mass der spezifischer Reaktionsaktivierung, wurde berechnet. Zur Beant-
wortung der zweiten Fragestellung der Dissertations, ob die freie Handlungswahl durch
emotionale Eigenschaften von Handlungseffekten modulierbar ist, wurde Experiment 5
durchgeführt, welches aus einer Lernphase und einer Testphase bestand. In der Lernphase
wurden einfache Handlungen (Tastendruck) mit spezifischen Handlungseffekten assoziiert,
die unterschiedliche emotionale Valenzen - negativ oder positiv aufwiesen. Dies wurde
mit Hilfe von affektiven Bildern in Kombination mit Tönen erreicht (z.B. linke Taste >
positives Bild und Ton1, rechte Taste > negatives Bild und Ton2). In der Testphase wur-
den nun nur die beiden Effekttöne dargeboten und die Aufgabe der Probanden bestand
darin, eine der beiden bekannten Tasten nach freier Wahl zu drücken. Zu erwarten war,
dass die mit unterschiedlichen Affekten assoziierten Töne die Tastenwahl unterschiedlich
beeinflussen.
Ergebnisse und Diskussion: In den Experimenten 2 und 3 zeigte sich im LBP eine sig-
nifikante, mit der Lernphase konsistente, Reaktionsaktivierung nach der Darbietung der
subliminalen Handlungseffekte. Dieses Ergebnis demonstriert, dass unbewusst darge-
botene Handlungseffekte automatisch diejenige Handlung aktivieren, mit der sie zuvor
assoziiert wurden. Unter bestimmten Bedingungen kann eine solche Handlungsaktivierung
die freie Wahl von Handlungen beeinflussen, d.h. es kommt zu einer häufigeren Wahl der-
jenigen Handlung, die auch mit dem zuvor dargebotenen Effekt assoziiert wurde (Experi-
ment 1). Desweiteren konnte gezeigt werden, dass nicht nur sensorische (direkt wahrnehm-
bare), sondern auch emotionale (subjektive) Eigenschaften von Handlungseffekten mit den
sie hervorrufenden Handlungen assoziiert werden können. Zudem wurde deutlich, dass die
emotionale Valenz von Handlungseffekten einen Einfluss auf die freie Reaktionswahl hat.
In Experiment 5 wurden mit der Lernphase konsistente Reaktionen signifikant häufiger
gewählt, wenn der zuvor dargebotene Handlungseffekt positiv assoziiert war. Für negativ
assoziierte Handlungseffekte zeigte sich dieser Unterschied nicht. Die Ergebnisse dieser
Dissertation bestätigen die Hypothese, dass Handlungen durch die Antizipation ihrer Ef-
fekte automatisch aktiviert werden, selbst wenn diese Antizipation unbewusst geschieht
(Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Kunde, 2004). Zusammenfassend konnten die Untersuchungen
der Dissertation dazu beigetragen, das Wissen über Handlungskontrollmechanismen ins-
besondere des ideomotorischen Prinzips (James, 1890) zu erweitern.
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Table 7.1: Pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) used as neg-
ative action-effects in Experiment 5.
No of IAPS picture Valence Arousal
1274 3.17 5.39
2120 3.34 5.18
2800 1.78 5.49
7380 2.46 5.88
9001 3.10 3.67
9007 2.49 5.03
9041 2.48 4.64
9102 3.34 4.84
9320 2.65 4.93
9561 2.68 4.79
9571 1.96 5.64
9584 3.34 4.96
2900 2.45 5.09
3301 1.80 5.21
2053 2.47 5.25
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Table 7.2: Pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) used as positive
action-effects in Experiment 5.
No of IAPS picture Valence Arousal
1463 7.45 4.79
1750 8.28 4.10
2070 8.17 4.51
2311 7.54 4.42
2341 7.38 4.11
8500 6.96 5.60
5660 7.27 5.07
5700 7.61 5.68
7325 7.06 3.55
7330 7.69 5.14
7470 7.08 4.64
1440 8.19 4.61
1710 8.34 5.41
7270 7.53 5.76
4250 6.79 5.16
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FRAGEBOGEN 
 
 
1. Konnten Sie erkennen, aus wie vielen und welchen Elementen das    
Figurengemisch zu Beginn eines Durchgangs bestand?  
 
     (Wenn ja, erklären Sie bitte kurz was sie erkennen konnten.) 
 
Ja 
 
Nein 
 
 
 
2. Wurden alle Elemente des Figurengemischs gleichzeitig dargeboten oder 
kam eines etwas später oder früher?  
 
 
                                                    gleichzeitig 
 
                                                    eine später               
 
                                                    eine früher               
 
 
 
3. Hatten Sie das Gefühl, die Tasten nach dem Kreuz frei gewählt zu haben? 
(Wenn nein, warum nicht?) 
 
 
Ja 
 
Nein 
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